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This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters analyze the different channels by 
which changes to the Chinese economy affect the dynamics of the US (and German, in 
Chapter 1) term structures. The third chapter contributes to the active cross-sectional asset 
pricing literature by analyzing how R&D investments and past returns interact in explaining 
future returns. 
 
The aim of the first chapter, entitled “A Chinese slowdown and the US and German yield 
curves”, is to quantify the impact of the Chinese economy on the US and German term 
structures of interest rates through the lenses of traditional asset pricing models. 
 
Given the interconnectedness of China and the rest of developed economies, a Chinese 
slowdown might spill over to the US and German economies, and hence also to their term 
structures of interest rates, in two ways. First, lower Chinese growth might signal lower 
expectations about future growth and inflation. Second, bad news about the Chinese 
economy might increase the uncertainty about future developed market growth and inflation. 
Consequently, market participants might revise their expectations of future monetary policy 
actions in light of this new information. In an environment where the short rate is at the 
effective lower bound, this implies that the Central Banks will hold interest rates “lower for 
longer.” Correspondingly, a lower Chinese growth leads to a lower term premium, the 
compensation for bearing the duration risk. 
 
I estimate an affine term structure model to decompose the 5y nominal yield in (1) an 
expected future 5y nominal short rate, “the expectations channel,” and (2) the 5y term (risk) 
premium. Empirically, I represent a Chinese slowdown with a drop in the Chinese leading 
indicator. 
 
A drop in the Chinese leading indicator decreases the 5y Treasury and Bund yields by 
decreasing the 5y term premia. My empirical findings are consistent with the argument that a 
Chinese slowdown is a signal for lower long term nominal interest rates and mainly alters 
risks that future growth and inflation will be lower than expected. In the post financial crisis 
1
environment with low growth and inflation, and monetary policy constrained by the effective 
lower bound, investors became very sensitive to a deterioration of the outlook about the 
Chinese economy. They are willing to accept lower compensation for holding nominal long-
term bonds instead of short-term securities. 
 
The second chapter, entitled “Chinese foreign reserves and the US yield curve”, focuses on 
the bilateral relationship between the US and China. In particular, I am investigating how 
the accumulation of the Chinese foreign reserves is affecting the US yield curve through the 
lenses of modern portfolio-balance models. 
 
China is managing its exchange rate against the US Dollar. The Renminbi was pegged to the 
US Dollar since 1994. In 2005, China moved towards a managed peg. The Renminbi, 
however, preserved a tight link to the US Dollar. The combination of a managed exchange 
rate and record-high growth rates resulted in a surge in the Chinese foreign exchange 
reserves. By June 2014, the Chinese foreign reserves increased to 4 trillion US Dollars. 
 
After the financial crisis, however, the Chinese foreign reserves were growing at lower and 
even negative yearly rates, while the Renminbi appreciated. The strong Renminbi put an 
additional anchor on economic growth, which was already slowing down. A substantial 
appreciation of the Renminbi in 2014 due to a strong US Dollar and economic slowdown in 
China were building market consensus that the Renminbi was overvalued. In July 2015, the 
PBOC moved closer towards the market determination of the Renminbi. Market participants 
interpreted the regime change as the beginning of a sizeable depreciation. 
 
I find that when the Chinese official sector rebalances away from the US Dollar, it lowers the 
5y Treasury yield and the 5y Treasury term premium. Such rebalancing can be a result of 
(unexpected) significant depreciation of the Renminbi against the US Dollar and increased 
(unobserved) uncertainty that the future growth of the Chinese economy will be lower than 
expected. In an environment where the monetary policy is constrained by the effective lower 
bound, lower Chinese foreign reserves increase the value of the 5y US Treasuries and decrease 
the 5y Treasury term premium. 
 
2
The third chapter, entitled “R&D Investments, Past Returns, and the Cross-Section of Stock 
Returns”, investigates how R&D investments and past returns interact in explaining future 
returns. Existing empirical literature gathered evidence that firms with high R&D-to-market 
value are rewarded with higher future returns. Firms with a higher level of R&D 
expenditures, however, are not rewarded with higher future returns unless they have 
experienced poor past performance.  
 
I contribute to the literature by estimating the cross-sectional regressions which show that 
the level of R&D interacts differently than changes of R&D in explaining future stock 
returns. Firms, which are reluctant to cut the level of R&D expenditures despite the poor 
past performance, are rewarded with higher subsequent returns. On the other hand, the good 
track record in the past price performance is providing a signal for higher future returns when 
managers decide to increase the R&D expenditures. Only firms, which have demonstrated 
their ability to make good investment decisions, and therefore exerted positive price 







Chapter 1: A Chinese slowdown and the US and German yield 
curves 
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Abstract 
To measure the global spillovers of a Chinese slowdown on the 5y nominal interest rates in the 
US/Germany, I model the US/German yield curves jointly in the post financial crisis sample, including 
the Chinese leading indicator as a new factor. I use an affine term structure model and decompose 
changes in the 5y nominal interest rates into (1) changes in the 5y expected future nominal short rate, 
and (2) the 5y term premium. A drop in the Chinese leading indicator decreased the 5y Treasury yield 
and the compensation for bearing the duration risk (the 5y Treasury term premium). In Germany, the 
lower Chinese leading indicator moderately increased the 5y Bund yield by increasing the term 
premium attached to the 5y German Bunds. However, as such increases of the term premium could be 
driven by recessions I re-estimate a single country affine term structure model for Germany in the post 
sovereign debt crisis sample. Like in the US, I now find that in Germany, a lower Chinese leading 
indicator decreased the 5y Bund yield and its term premium. 
 
1. Introduction 
The last decades have witnessed tremendous growth of the Chinese economy. In 2017, China 
accounted for 15 percent of global GDP, compared to only 3 percent in 1999. While the 
growth of the Chinese economy continues to outshine that of its global peers, the growth has 
dropped from double digits before the crisis to 7–8 percent after the crisis. 
 
Existing work has investigated the impact of (changes in) Chinese growth on, amongst 
others, the global/US/EU growth and inflation dynamics, unequivocally finding the effects to 
                                        
1 
Tilburg University, Finance Department, e-mail: maletic.matjaz@gmail.com
 
2
 I would like to thank Joost Driessen, Frank de Jong, Narayan Bulusu, Arjana Brezigar Masten and the Brown 
Bag seminar and Macro Reading group participants at Tilburg University. I would like to thank Igor Loncarski, 
and especially my supervisors Bertrand Melenberg and Lieven Baele for their comments. I would like to thank 






. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to quantify the effects of a 
Chinese slowdown on the US and German yield curves. This is my main contribution. 
 
I hypothesize that a Chinese slowdown can affect the US/German yield curves through two 
channels, in several (possibly opposing) ways. 
 
First, changes in Chinese growth may affect the future expectations of fundamental drivers of 
the US/German yield curve, such as inflation and real growth rates in these respective 
countries. Gauvin and Rebillard (2015) and Metelli and Natoli (2017), for instance, show that 
a Chinese slowdown has substantial negative effects on the US and euro area (EA) growth 
and inflation rates5. The resulting drop in expected real short-term interest rates and 
inflation leads to a drop in expectations about future nominal short rates. Following Bauer 
and Rudebusch (2014), I call the future expected nominal short rate the “signaling channel.” 
 
Second, changes in Chinese growth may affect the US and German term premia attached to 
the nominal bonds. The lower Chinese growth could lower the expectations of the nominal 
interest rates by decreasing the compensation for bearing the duration risk (the term 
premium) through lower growth and inflation risks. First, deterioration of the economic 
outlook of the Chinese economy, and its consequences for the outlook of the global economy 
could imply that at the effective lower bound the Central banks will have to hold rates lower 
for longer. In such an environment, nominal bonds hedge against the risk of lower growth 
while other instruments such as risky stocks do not. Second, lower Chinese growth could 
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Cashin, Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) find that a percentage decrease of the Chinese growth lowers the global 
growth by 23 basis points, while a surge in global financial market volatility decreases the global growth by 29 
basis points. 
4
 ECB (2017) estimates that if the Chinese GDP growth decreases by 3 percentage points cumulatively over three 
years commodity prices decrease by 6 percent over three years.  
5
 Metelli and Natoli (2017) estimate that, without taking into account the Central Bank’s responses, a negative 
shock to Chinese investments, and corresponding reduction in annual output growth equal to 2 percentage points 
over two consecutive years, decrease the US and EA inflation by 10 basis points in the first, and by 40 basis 
points in the second year. The shock decreases EA GDP by 30 basis points in the first year and by 20 basis points 




increase the risks of lower inflation through, i.e., Chinese lower demand for commodities
6
. 
The lower inflation increases the real value of fixed dollar payments that bondholders receive. 
To hedge against the risks of low growth and inflation investors are willing to accept low or 
even negative compensation for holding nominal bonds rather than short-term securities.  
 
Albeit less likely, the lower Chinese growth could increase the risk premium attached to 
nominal bonds by increasing the uncertainty about the near-term outlook for the global 
economy or monetary policy. Such increases, however, are usually associated with recessions. 
In the euro area, the 5y Bund term premium increased during the sovereign debt crisis. In 
the US, the 5y Treasury term premium temporarily increased during “the taper tantrum” 
episode in 2013. Additionally, extremely low Chinese growth could be related to higher risk 
aversion (U-shaped pricing kernels) and could alter the term premium in a non-linear fashion. 
Baele et al. (2018) find that the model which accounts for the probability weighting (and loss 
aversion), namely that the investors attach higher probabilities to extreme events (disasters) 
explains the equity and the variance premia. Since for a global bond investor turmoil in 
China could represent a catastrophic event, she could correspondingly overweight such an 
event and given her loss aversion attach bigger term premium when Chinese growth decreases 
by a significant amount (i.e. more than 5 percent per year). 
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the 5y Treasury and Bund yields, and of the Chinese 
leading indicator, in the post financial crisis sample. Actual 5y Bund yield decreased from 2.5 
percent in 2009 to –18 basis points in 2017. After the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB initiated 
the QE programmes which depressed the 5y Bund yield. In 2013, the FED chairman Ben 
Bernanke signaled a decrease of the QE programmes (“the taper tantrum”). In December 
2015, the FED began the hiking cycle. From December 2011 to December 2017 the actual 5y 
Bund yield decreased from 87 to –18 basis points while the actual 5y Treasury yield increased 
from 87 to 217 basis points. 
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Figure 1: Chinese composite leading indicator (CLI) with trend-restored in twelve-month log differences and the 
actual 5-year Treasury and Bund yields. The dotted red line depicts a linear trend of the Chinese leading indicator 
after the crisis. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Source: BUBA, FED, and the OECD. 
 
My main contribution is to measure the global spillovers of a Chinese slowdown on the US 
and German 5y nominal yields, the 5y risk-neutral yields, and the 5y term premia. I measure 
the slowdown with the difference between the GDP growth rates of the domestic economies 
(the US and Germany) and China. Empirically, I represent the growth rates at a monthly 
frequency with the leading indicators. To quantify the spillovers of a Chinese slowdown on 
the US/German 5y yields through the future 5y expected short rates and the 5y term premia, 
as well as to disentangle both channels, I proceed as follows. 
 
I estimate the joint affine term structure model of the US and German yield curves with the 
unspanned macroeconomic variables in the post financial crisis sample. With an affine term 
structure model, I decompose the 5y nominal yields in (1) the expected future 5y nominal 
short rates, “the signaling channel,” and (2) the estimated 5y term premia, “the portfolio 
balance channel.” The alternative name for the first component, the expected future 5y 
nominal short rate, is the 5y risk-neutral yield. In the model I include, the six principal 
components extracted jointly from the US and German yield curves and the macroeconomic 

























FED begins the hiking 




the unemployment rate, core inflation rate, the leading indicator, and the Chinese leading 
indicator. 
 
In the affine term structure model with the unspanned macroeconomic variables, the 
macroeconomic variable such as the Chinese leading indicator affects the bond prices only 
indirectly through the principal components with a lag. In each economy, the US and 
Germany, I run a vector autoregression of the principal components and the macroeconomic 
variables. I increase the principal components by the significant estimated coefficients I find 
on the Chinese leading indicator. I interpret the changes in the means of the in-sample model 
implied 5y yields, the 5y risk-neutral yields, and the 5y term premia before and after the 
increase as the average effects of the Chinese leading indicator. These effects are measuring 
the economic importance of the Chinese leading indicator for the 5y yields, the 5y risk-
neutral yields, and the 5y term premia. 
 
My main empirical results yield several new findings. 
 
I find that in the US, a one percentage point lower Chinese leading indicator lowers the 5y 
Treasury yield and the 5y Treasury term premium by 4.1 basis points over the short run. In 
the 5th month, the 5y Treasury yield decreases by 10.2 basis points, the 5y Treasury term 
premium by 9.2 basis points, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 1 basis point. The 
responses of the 5y Treasury yield, the 5y Treasury term premium, and the 5y Treasury risk-
neutral yield change by less than 1 basis point (in the absolute terms) in the 12th month. The 
lower Chinese leading indicator has an economically important negative impact on the 5y 
Treasury yield and its term premium7. 
 
At first glance, the Chinese leading indicator affects the 5y Bund yield in the opposite way as 
the 5y Treasury yield. The lower Chinese leading indicator increases the 5y Bund yield and 
the term premium attached to the 5y German Bunds. Over the short run, the 5y Bund yield 
increases by 3.8 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium by 3.3 basis points, and the 5y 
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 In my companion paper, Maletic (2018), I find that the lower growth of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves 
represents incremental information to the Chinese leading indicator and signals a lower 5y Treasury yield and 




Bund risk-neutral yield by 0.5 basis points. In the 5
th
 month, the 5y Bund yield increases by 
5.9 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium by 4.7 basis points, and the 5y Bund risk-neutral 
yield by 1.2 basis points. However, as such increases are usually associated with recessions 
the effect could be driven by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. I find that 
the effects of the Chinese leading indicator on the 5y Bund yield and its term premium 
change direction and increase in the economic magnitude after the sovereign debt crisis. With 
the four-factor single country affine term structure model I find that in the 12
th
 month, in the 
post sovereign debt crisis sample, the model implied 5y Bund yield decreases by 22.5 basis 
points, the 5y Bund term premium by 21.9 basis points and the 5y Bund risk-neutral yield by 
0.6 basis points. 
 
The different direction of the effects in the US and Germany in a joint model after the 
financial crisis stems from two sources. First, although the principal components are 
extracted jointly from the US and German yield curves, I condition on a different set of 
domestic macroeconomic variables when I estimate the average effects of the Chinese leading 
indicator. Considering the link between the US/German unemployment rates and core 
inflations, and the difference between the leading indicators of the US/Germany and China is 
important when quantifying the effect of the Chinese leading indicator on the US and 
German yield curves. Second, and more importantly, after the financial crisis, we have 
witnessed the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The estimated effects change direction 
and strengthen in economic magnitude in Germany after the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
My empirical findings suggest that the lower Chinese leading indicator mainly alters the term 
premia attached to the 5y nominal bonds. It signals lower 5y nominal interest rates and 
decreases the compensation for bearing the term (duration) risk in the US after the financial 
crisis, and in Germany after the sovereign debt crisis. The deterioration of the outlook about 
the Chinese economy provides a signal for lower longer-term nominal interest rates going 
forward. In an environment with low levels of growth, inflation and accommodative monetary 
policy constrained with the effective lower bound, investors are willing to accept lower 
compensation for holding nominal bonds instead of short-term securities, and are very 
sensitive towards signals about the future growth and inflation risks such as deterioration of 




The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an affine term structure 
model. Section 3 presents the data. Main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Affine Term Structure M odel 
I estimate an affine term structure model. I use an estimator proposed by Diez de Los Rios 
(2015, 2018). His asymptotic least-square (ALS) estimator is internally consistent and has a 
limiting distribution which is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood. The 
evolution of the state variables (under the historical measure) follows the vector-
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Where 
  
  – spanned pricing factors (principal components)        
  
  – unspanned macroeconomic variables        
 
I use the principal component analysis and extract the principal components jointly from the 
US and German nominal term structures of interest rates (  
 ). The macroeconomic variables 
(   ) affect the bond prices merely through the principal components with a lag. In the US, in 
the model, I include the unspanned macroeconomic variables the US unemployment rate, the 
US core inflation, the US leading indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. In Germany, 
in the model, I include the German unemployment rate, German core inflation, German 
leading indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. The principal components which I 
extract jointly from the US and German yield curves do not change. 
 
Shocks,    [      ] , conditionally on lagged principal components and unspanned 
macroeconomic variables follow a Normal distribution,   |{  }        (   ).  ,  , and   are 
partitioned according to the spanned and unspanned factors. Namely, 
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The bond pricing factors (principal components) and the nominal short-term interest rates in 
the US and Germany are related through the affine relation 
 
       
   
   
    
  
                        (3) 
 
The two-country affine term structure model allows for different loadings (  
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Similarly as in the single-country case, under the risk-neutral probability measure, the 
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Shocks,     [   
 
  
  ] , conditionally on lagged principal components and unspanned 
macroeconomic variables follow a Normal distribution,    |{  }        (   ).   is the same matrix 
as in (2). The pricing (risk-neutral) transition matrices,    and   , can be written as 
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Because unspanned macroeconomic variables do not affect bond prices under the pricing 
measure following Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013),      ,              ,              , 
the upper right       block of risk-neutral matrix   ,      (        ) is zero, and therefore 
      
         . 
 
Given the assumptions (1) – (5), (log) bond prices of maturity   in country   at time period   
are exponentially affine in the spanned factors (principal components) 
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The continuously compounded yield on a  -period zero-coupon bond in country   at time   
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Following Diez de Los Rios (2018) recursive linear restrictions   
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When prices of risk parameters     and      in (8) and (9) are set to zero, the recursions generate 
the risk adjusted bond pricing parameters 
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Risk-adjusted parameters imply that the model-fitted yields equal the time   expectation of 
the average future short rates over the next   periods,   ( (
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 ). 
The risk neutral yield (   ), and the term premium (  ), the difference between the model-
implied fitted yield and the risk neutral yield, can be written as10,11 
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Diez de Los Rios (2018) notices that when the state variables are linear combinations of 
yields (i.e.,           
( )
   (  
   
   
    
  
 ), for some full-rank matrix  ) self-consistency 
implies12,13 
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Diez de Los Rios (2015) exploits conditions in (15) and proposes an asymptotic least squares 
(ALS) estimator. Estimator in Diez de Los Rios (2018) allows estimation of a multi-country 
affine term structure model with a large number of spanned factors (principal components). 
 
To investigate how the Chinese leading indicator affects the spanned factors (  
 ) and (log) 
bond prices (      
( )
) I focus on  ̂  . I increase principal components extracted from the US 
and German yield curves by the estimated coefficients  ̂   which are statistically significantly 
different from zero and correspond to the Chinese leading indicator. I compare the change in 
the mean of the model implied 5y Treasury/Bund yields, the 5y Treasury/Bund risk-neutral 
                                                                                                                           
Moench and Yu (2016) show that announcements of asset purchase programmes lower the long-term nominal 
interest rates mainly by lowering the model implied real term premium. 
11
 Bernanke (2015) points out that after 2013 the 10-year Treasury term premium is more important for low 10-
year Treasury yield than the 10-year Treasury risk-neutral yield. 
12
 Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) pointed out that variables which are linear combinations of yields, state variables 
which come out of the model, should be equal to imposed observed pricing factors. 
13
 To ensure the positivity of covariance matrix   Diez de Los Rios (2018) focuses on its Cholesky decomposition, 






yields, and the 5y Treasury/Bund term premia before and after I increase the principal 
components by the estimated coefficients  ̂  . I interpret the difference in the means as the 
average effect of the Chinese leading indicator on the model implied 5y Treasury/Bund 
yields, the model implied 5y Treasury/Bund risk-neutral yields, and the model implied 5y 
Treasury/Bund term premia. 
 
3. Data 
I estimate the joint model of the US and German nominal term structure of interest rates in 
the post financial crisis sample, from June 2009 to December 2017. The parameters of the 
zero-coupon yield curve are retrieved from Deutsche Bundesbank (BUBA) and Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Wright (2007). 
 
I focus on the maturities from 1 to 60 months (5 years). The rest of the data is as follows. 
Core inflation and unemployment rates for the US and Germany are from the FRED 
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and from Eurostat. I retrieve the leading 




The leading indicator is constructed in such a way as to identify and predict the turning 
points in the business cycles. Reference series which is chosen to approximate the economic 
activity is the quarterly growth of the GDP. The OECD generates monthly estimates of the 
GDP based on the official quarterly estimates. 
 
The database on the main economic indicators (MEI) provides the main source of variables 
that are included in the indicator. The variables can be grouped in (1) GDP and industrial 
production, (2) selected commodity output variables (crude steel, crude petroleum etc.), (3) 
business and consumer tendency survey series, (4) selected manufacturing variables 
(deliveries, stocks, new orders etc.), (5) construction, (6) domestic trade, (7) labor market 
series, (8) consumer and producer prices, (9) money aggregates, (10) interest rates, (11) 
financial variables, (12) exchange rates, (13) international trade and (14) balance of 
payments data. 
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I use the trend restored version of the index in 12-month log differences. This version of the 
index most closely tracks the yearly GDP growth rate and is available at a monthly 
frequency. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the six principal components extracted jointly from the US and German 
term structures in the post financial crisis sample. The loadings on the yields of different 
maturities of the first and the second principal component are a mixture of level and slope. 
Loadings of the third to the sixth principal component do not have meaningful economic 













Figure 2: Loadings of US (black line) and German (dashed-blue line) monthly zero-coupon yields with maturities 
of one to sixty months (5 years) on the six global principal components. Sample spans from June 2009 to 
December 2017. 
 
Figure 3 plots the first two principal components extracted jointly from the US and German 
nominal term structures in the post financial crisis sample. In the post financial crisis sample, 
the dynamics of principal component 1 are similar to the dynamics of the 5y Bund yield. The 
dynamics of principal component 2 are similar to the dynamics of the 5y Treasury yield. 
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Loadings on 3rd PC Loadings on 4th PC 




sectional dimension (both are a mixture of levels and slopes), the principal components 1 and 
2 in the time-series dimension show clear diverging patterns which are most probably due to 




Figure 3: Principal component 1 and 2 in the post financial crisis sample (from June 2009 to December 2017). 
 
Table 1 shows the average percentage of explained variation of 60 yields with monthly 
maturities when I use one to six principal components. One factor model shows a clear 
disconnect between the US and German yields. While the first principal component extracted 
jointly from the US and German nominal term structures explains 97 percent of Bund yield 
variation, it explains only 11 percent of Treasury yield variation (up to the maturity of 5 
years). The two-factor model already explains almost 90 percent of the variation of the US 
and more than 98 percent of the variation of German yields. However, the pattern of loadings 
on the yields of different maturities of the first two principal components in the US and 
Germany is not clear. Figure 4 depicts   s of the first six principal components on 120 yields 














Table 1: Average percentage of explained variation of 60 monthly maturity yields in the US and Germany when I 






Figure 4: Percentage of explained variation of monthly yields with maturities of one to sixty months (5 years) in 
the US and Germany with the global six-factor model (which uses global PC1 to PC6). Sample spans from June 
2009 to December 2017. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the growth of the Chinese leading indicator before and after the financial 
crisis. The average growth of the Chinese leading indicator from 1998 to 2007, 14.2 percent, 
decreased to 10.3 percent in the post financial crisis sample. The growth of Chinese leading 
indicator after the financial crisis exhibits a clear downward trend. The yearly growth of the 
leading indicator in December 2017 decreased to 5 percent. From June 2009 to December 
2017 the mean of the Chinese leading indicator is equal to 10.3 percent, and its standard 
deviation is equal to 4.5 percent. 
 
One Factor Two Factors Three Factors Four Factors Five Factors Six Factors
U.S. 11.2% 89.8% 98.8% 99.2% 99.8% 99.9%

















Figure 5: Average growth of the Chinese composite leading indicator before and after the financial crisis. Twelve-
month log differences. Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Source: OECD. 
 
Figure 6 shows the US, Chinese and German leading indicators in the post financial crisis 
sample. Average yearly growth rates of the US and German leading indicators are similar. 
From June 2009 to December 2017, on average, US leading indicator increased by 2.1 
percent. The German leading indicator increased by 2 percent. However, the German leading 
indicator seems to be exhibiting larger cyclical movements than the US leading indicator in 
the post financial crisis sample. Its standard deviation is 2.2 percent compared to 1.4 percent 
in the US. The growth of the Chinese leading indicator is converging towards the growth of 




Figure 6: The US, German and Chinese composite leading indicators (CLIs) with trends-restored. Twelve-month 





















Figure 7 (left panel) presents the US and German core inflations. In the post financial crisis 
sample, the average German core inflation equals 1.1 percent. The average core inflation in 
the US equals 1.7 percent. Core inflations are below 2 percent, the policy target inflation 
rate. Figure 7 (right panel) shows the unemployment rates. In the US the unemployment rate 
decreased from 10 percent in September 2009 to 4.1 percent by December 2017. The German 





Figure 7: US and German core inflation rates (left panel) and unemployment rates (right panel). Sample spans 
from June 2009 to December 2017. Source: St. Louis FRED and Eurostat. 
 
In Figure 8 we can see that the 5y Bund term premium decreased from 2.4 percent in 
December 2009 to 1.2 percent by August 2010. The Chinese leading indicator decreased from 
24 percent to 13 percent over the same period. During the sovereign debt crisis, the 5y Bund 
term premium temporarily increased to 2.5 percent in March 2011 but decreased to 80 basis 
points by December 2011. By September 2016, the 5y Bund term premium decreased to  40 
basis points. It increased to 28 basis points by December 2017. The Chinese leading indicator, 
on the other hand, steadily decreased from 13 percent in August 2010 to 5 percent by 
























Figure 8: 5y Bund term premium and the Chinese leading indicator. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 
2017. Source: OECD. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. After the crisis, the average German unemployment 
rate, 5.3 percent, is smaller than in the US, 7 percent. Average German nominal short rate is 
negative, –4 basis points. Its standard deviation is higher than in the US, 49 compared to 34 
basis points. In the post financial crisis sample, the average 5-year Bund yield equals 69 basis 
points and is lower than in the US, 154 basis points. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Yearly growth of OECD leading indicators, core inflation rates, unemployment 
rates, nominal short rates (one-month government nominal yields), and the 5-year government nominal yields in 
the US and Germany. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Source: FRED database of the Federal 








US GER US GER 5th 95th 5th 95th 
OECD leading indicator  
(yearly growth) 
2.1% 2.0% 1.4% 2.2% 0.7% 4.8% -1.3% 6.9% 
Core Inflation 1.7% 1.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.9% 2.2% 0.6% 1.5% 
Unemployment rate 7.0% 5.3% 1.9% 1.1% 4.3% 9.8% 3.7% 7.6% 
Short rate  
(1m nominal yield) 
39 -4 34 49 3 125 -82 79 

























4. M ain Results 
In this section, I present my main empirical results. Before I introduce the decomposition of 
the 5y Treasury and Bund yields in the 5y Treasury/Bund risk-neutral yields and the 5y 
Treasury/Bund term premia, I present the short and long-run effects of the Chinese leading 
indicator on the actual 5y Treasury/Bund yields.  
 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of the five-variable vector-autoregression for the 
US economy. All variables included in the regression are in percentage points. Estimated 
effects are for a percentage point increase, except for the Chinese leading indicator where the 
estimated effects are for a percentage point decrease. In the last column of Table 3, we can 
see that a percentage point lower Chinese leading indicator on average decreases the 5y 
Treasury yield by 4.3 basis points. In the first row of Table 3, we can see that the effects of 
the US macroeconomic variables are significant. A percentage point increase of the US 
unemployment on average decreases the 5y Treasury yield by 12.2 basis points. Higher US 
core inflation on average decreases the 5y Treasury yield by 28.9 basis points. Although 
significant at the 10% level, the effect of the US leading indicator is small in economic 






Table 3: Estimated coefficients of a five-variable vector autoregression:  
             . Variables included in the regression: 5y Treasury yield, US unemployment, US core inflation, 
US leading indicator, and Chinese leading indicator. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Bolded 




Table 4 present the results for the German economy. Macroeconomic variables affect the 5y 
Bund yield in the opposite direction than in the US. A percentage point higher German 
unemployment increases the 5y Bund yield, on average by 19 basis points. The effect of 
German core inflation is positive but becomes insignificant. This suggests that in Germany, 
the 5y Bund yield was reacting more to the output gap than to inflation in the post financial 
crisis sample. 
 
Estimated coefficients on the leading indicators are significant but of the opposite sign than 
in the US. A percentage point higher German leading indicator increases 5y Bund yield on 
average by 2.3 basis points. The economic magnitude is fairly similar to the Chinese leading 
indicator. A percentage point lower Chinese leading indicator increases the 5y Bund yield on 





(          ) (             ) (             ) (          )
5y Treasury Yield 0.7092 -0.1222 -0.2890 -0.0269 0.0425
(t-statistic) 11.21 -3.87 -3.50 -1.72 3.36
-0.0607 0.9438 -0.0950 -0.0311 0.0244
(t-statistic) -1.28 40.04 -1.54 -2.66 2.58
0.0025 0.0103 0.9131 -0.0224 -0.0088
(t-statistic) 0.08 0.62 20.93 -2.71 -1.32
-0.0630 -0.2065 0.1231 0.8412 0.1326
(t-statistic) -1.10 -7.20 1.64 59.18 11.56
-0.0173 -0.1374 -0.3702 -0.4144 1.0544
(t-statistic) -0.19 -3.04 -3.13 -18.48 58.28
    
     
    
      
     
     






Table 4: Estimated coefficients of a five-variable vector autoregression:  
             . Variables included in the regression: 5y Bund yield, German unemployment, German core 
inflation, German leading indicator, and Chinese leading indicator. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 




Figure 9 depicts the impulse response functions of the 5y Treasury yield (left panel) to one 
percentage point negative shock to the Chinese leading indicator. The response of the 5y 
Treasury yield strengthens from  4.2 basis points in the 1st month to  10.6 basis points in 
the 6th month. Afterwards, it reverts to  7.6 basis points and remains significantly different 
from 0 in the 12th month. In the right panel of Figure 9, we can observe that the economic 
magnitude of the response of the 5y Bund yield is smaller and goes in the opposite way than 
in the US. The response is significant only in the first month. The 5y Bund yield increases by 
2.5 basis points. 
  
Factor
(5y Bund Yield) (          ) (             ) (             ) (          )
5y Bund Yield 0.8568 0.1915 0.1145 0.0226 -0.0247
(t-statistic) 18.80 3.22 1.48 2.17 -2.27
-0.0163 0.9954 -0.0064 -0.0079 0.0018
(t-statistic) -1.13 52.68 -0.26 -2.40 0.53
0.2839 -0.4714 -0.1853 -0.0988 0.0539
(t-statistic) 5.07 -6.46 -1.95 -7.74 4.04
-0.5205 0.1902 0.3537 0.9278 0.1122
(t-statistic) -5.76 1.61 2.30 44.98 5.20
0.0595 0.3001 0.4879 -0.1329 0.9443
(t-statistic) 0.50 1.93 2.41 -4.88 33.19
    
         
     
       
      
     
                









Figure 9: Orthogonalized impulse response functions of the 5y Treasury yield (left panel) and the 5y Bund yield 
(right panel) to 1 percentage point shock to Chinese OECD leading indicator. I estimate two structural vector 
auto-regressions with Cholesky identification scheme. Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Variables 
included in the US model: 5y Treasury yield, US unemployment, US core inflation, US leading indicator, and 
Chinese leading indicator. Variables included in the German model: 5y Bund yield, German unemployment, 
German core inflation, German leading indicator, and Chinese leading indicator. Chinese leading indicator is 
ordered last and lower-triangular variance-covariance matrix of shocks is imposed. 
 
Next, I estimate the two-country affine term structure model with the unspanned 
macroeconomic variables following Diez de Los Rios (2018). I use principal component 
analysis and extract principal components which are explaining the most of variation in the 
US and German yield curves. In the US, in the model, I include the six principal components, 
the US unemployment, US core inflation rate, the US leading indicator, and the Chinese 
leading indicator. In Germany, in the model, I include German unemployment, German core 
inflation, German leading indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. I estimate the affine 
term structure model with the unspanned macroeconomic variables. I use the identity 
 ̂    ̂ 
   to measure the effects of the macroeconomic variables on the six principal 
components, and bond prices. 
 
Table 5 presents the estimated prices of risks of the six-factor model for the US economy. 
Average pricing error shrinks from 4.3 basis points to 1.4 basis points as I move from the five 
to the six-factor model (of the fitted 5y Treasury yield). The risk of the first principal 
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Response of the 5y Treasury yield to 1% shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) (in bps) 
Response of the 5y Bund yield to 1% shock to Chinese 
















unemployment, US core inflation, and the US leading indicator. Risks of the second principal 
component are affected significantly by the second, the third principal component and all 
four macroeconomic variables: the US unemployment, US core inflation, US leading indicator, 
and the Chinese leading indicator. The risks of the third principal component are affected 
significantly by the first principal component, the second, the third and the fourth principal 
components. The US unemployment, US core inflation, and the Chinese leading indicator 
affect the risk of the third principal component significantly. The fourth principal component 
is affected significantly by the first, the fourth principal component, the US leading indicator, 
and the Chinese leading indicator. The fifth PC is affected significantly by itself and the US 
leading indicator. The sixth PC is affected significantly by the third, the fourth, the sixth 






Table 5: Estimated prices of risk,   
  and   
   of the two-country affine term structure model using an estimator as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample spans from June 
2009 to December 2017. Spanned factors:   
  [                              ]
 . Unspanned factors:   
  [                            ] . Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 10% level. I present the remaining estimated parameters in Appendix A.1.        – US unemployment rate,          – US core inflation rate,         – US 






(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6) (          ) (             ) (             ) (               )
PC 1 -0.0534 -0.3268 0.0464 -0.2144 0.0532 0.0530 -0.9977 5.8453 -16.4305 -2.5910 -0.1548
(t-statistic) -0.251 -3.721 0.666 -1.605 0.161 0.128 -1.721 2.172 -4.507 -2.789 -0.236
PC 2 0.5769 -0.0391 -0.2498 0.3264 -0.1057 -0.4421 -0.8609 -5.7030 -11.7262 -1.5982 1.7375
(t-statistic) 2.656 -0.436 -3.511 2.389 -0.313 -1.046 -1.452 -2.077 -3.153 -1.686 2.594
PC 3 -0.2106 -0.0493 0.0768 -0.0869 0.2320 -0.0539 -0.0102 2.5437 1.8737 0.2622 -0.5069
(t-statistic) -3.461 -1.958 3.757 -2.155 2.372 -0.434 -0.057 3.348 1.821 1.000 -2.735
PC 4 0.0973 0.0524 -0.0213 0.0203 -0.4760 -0.1031 0.1932 -0.6581 -0.7052 0.8485 -0.6093
(t-statistic) 1.649 2.144 -1.071 0.517 -4.998 -0.851 1.107 -0.895 -0.708 3.341 -3.394
PC 5 -0.0071 -0.0087 -0.0014 -0.0011 0.0528 -0.2402 -0.1820 -0.0269 -0.4523 -0.5021 0.0593
(t-statistic) -0.195 -0.568 -0.108 -0.042 0.843 -2.941 -1.521 -0.060 -0.749 -3.264 0.546
PC 6 0.0163 0.0110 -0.0060 0.0445 -0.1970 0.1134 -0.1896 0.0338 0.1168 0.3071 -0.1999
(t-statistic) 0.454 0.738 -0.506 1.925 -3.471 1.586 -1.862 0.075 0.191 1.969 -1.813
                                           




Figure 10 depicts the estimated 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield (left panel) and 5y Treasury 
term premium (right panel). The 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield increased from 47 basis 
points in June 2009 to 3.4 percent by December 2017. From December 2014 to December 
2017 the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield increased from  5 basis points to 3.4 percent. The 5y 
Treasury term premium (upper right panel, Figure 10) decreased from 2.1 percent in June 
2009 to 1 percent by October 2010, from where it increased to 2.2 percent in March 2011. 
Volatile 5y Treasury term premium can be at least in some part explained by the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. The 5y Treasury term premium decreased to 71 basis 
points by April 2013 from where it increased to 2 percent in December 2013. After 2014, the 
5y Treasury term premium decreased to  1.2 percent by December 2017. 
 
  
Figure 10: Model implied 5-year Treasury risk-neutral yield (expected future nominal short rate) (left panel) and 
the 5y Treasury term premium (right panel) estimated with the six-factor model (which uses PC1 to PC6) and 
unspanned macroeconomic variables: US unemployment, US core inflation, US leading indicator, and the Chinese 
leading indicator. I use an estimator as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample spans from June 2009 to 
December 2017. 
 
To measure the effect of the Chinese leading indicator on the US yield curve, I increase the 
principal components by the significant coefficients  ̂     which are estimated in Table 5. I 
calculate the change of the in-sample mean of the 5y Treasury yield, the 5y Treasury risk-
neutral yield and the 5y Treasury term premium which are presented in Figure 10. The mean 
of the model implied 5y Treasury yield increases by 4.1 percent. The mean of the 5y 
Treasury term premium increases by 4.1 percent and the mean of the model implied 5y 
Treasury risk-neutral yield remains unchanged. However, the estimated coefficients represent 


























indicator would increase by 100 percent. I divide the estimated effects by 100 and 
premultiply them by  1. 
 
A one percentage point decrease of the Chinese leading indicator decreases the model implied 
5y Treasury yield by 4.1 basis points and the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 
4.1 basis points while leaving the model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield unchanged15. 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for a percentage points decrease of the 
Chinese leading indicator of the model implied 5y Treasury yield is ( 7.1,  1), the model 
implied 5y Treasury term premium is ( 6.9,  1.3) and of the model implied 5y Treasury 
risk-neutral yield is ( 0.2, 0.3). 
 
Figure 11 presents the impulse response functions of the six principal components to “a unit” 
shock to the Chinese leading indicator in the model which includes the US macroeconomic 
variables. The estimated effect on the second principal component, 1.7375 (estimated 
coefficient in the 10th column of Table 5) decreases to 0.0027 (upper-middle panel in Figure 
11, the effect is pre-multiplied by  1). The response of the second principal component 
increases to 0.0065 by the 5th month from where it reverts back to 0. In Figure 11, we can 
observe that the responses of the third, the fourth, and the fifth principal components are 
significant as well. 
 
To measure the long-run effects of the Chinese leading indicator on the US yield curve, I 
proceed as follows. First, I compute average 5y Treasury yield, average 5y Treasury term 
premium and average 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield with the principal components (  ) 
which I extract from the yield curves. Second, I increase the principal components by 
responses in the 5th month when the responses of the 2nd, the 3rd, and the 4th PCs are 
significant and the highest (please refer to Figure 11). Third, I re-compute average 5y 
                                        
15 
When I do not condition on the US unemployment, US core inflation and the US leading indicator, average 
estimated effects in the US decrease to (in absolute terms): the model implied 5y Treasury yield decreases by 0.8 
basis points, the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 0.6 basis points, and the model implied 5y Treasury 




Treasury yield, average 5y Treasury term premium and average 5y Treasury risk-neutral 
yield with the new principal components. 
 
In particular, let   denote the Cholesky decomposition of  , such that      . Furthermore, 
let     
    be such that I can write shocks in (1) as     
    . Orthogonalized impulse 
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 ]   ̂
  ̂ 
 
(16) 
To scale the orthogonalized impulse of the Chinese leading indicator to a unit shock, I divide 
the responses by the standard deviation of the Chinese leading indicator (which I order last). 
The standard deviation corresponds to the element in the last row of the last column of  ̂. I 
multiply the responses by 10.000 to scale them to basis points responses. 
 
Next, I collect significant responses of the 6 principal components in the fifth month in a row 
vector which I denote    , and add the     to the principal components, which I extract 
from the yield curves 
 
 ̃ 
    
   ̂   (17) 
 
I re-estimate the 5y yield, the term premium and the risk-neutral yield with the new 
principal components,  ̃ 
 . I interpret the changes in the 5y yield, the term premium and the 
risk-neutral yield, which are estimated with   
  and  ̃ 
 , as average effects of a one percentage 
                                        
16 









 month, a one percentage point decrease of the Chinese leading indicator decreases 
the in-sample average of the model implied 5y Treasury yield by 10.2 basis points, the 5y 
Treasury term premium by 9.2 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 1 basis 
point. In the 12
th
 month, the model implied 5y Treasury yield decreases by 0.77 basis points, 
the 5y Treasury term premium by 0.33 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 
0.44 basis points. 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for a percentage points decrease of the 
Chinese leading indicator of the model implied 5y Treasury yield in the 5
th
 month is ( 17, 
 3.5), the model implied 5y Treasury term premium is ( 16.6,  1.9) and of the model 














































Figure 11: Orthogonalized responses of the six principal components to the negative impulse to the Chinese leading indicator (Cholesky identification scheme with lower 
triangular variance-covariance matrix). Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Variables included in the VAR are ordered as in the second row of Table 5. 
Response of PC 1 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 2 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 3 to “a unit” negative shock to 
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Table 6 presents the estimated prices of risks of the six-factor model for the German 
economy. The risk of the first principal component is affected significantly by itself, German 
unemployment, German leading indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. Risks of the 
second principal component are affected significantly by the first, the second, the third, and 
the sixth principal component. The risks of the third principal component are not affected 
significantly in the German case. The risks of the fourth principal component are affected 
significantly by the first, the second, the fourth principal component, the US leading 
indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. The risks of the fifth PC are affected 
significantly by the second principal component, by itself, the sixth principal component, 
German core inflation, and the German leading indicator. The sixth PC is affected 





Table 6: Estimated prices of risk,   
  and   
   of the two-country affine term structure model using an estimator as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample spans from June 
2009 to December 2017. Spanned factors:   
  [                              ]
 . Unspanned factors:   
  [                               ] . Bolded coefficients are 
significant at the 10% level. I present the remaining estimated parameters in Appendix A.1.         – German unemployment rate,           – German core inflation rate, 






(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6) (          ) (             ) (             ) (               )
PC 1 -0.5327 -0.1591 -0.0177 0.1200 -0.2197 -0.0184 -0.7666 13.6070 5.4407 1.4448 -2.4243
(t-statistic) -3.059 -2.637 -0.430 1.041 -0.685 -0.045 -1.284 3.880 1.342 1.980 -3.452
PC 2 -0.1132 -0.1075 -0.0852 0.2302 0.0886 -0.0790 -1.2165 3.2420 0.7140 0.4637 -0.2359
(t-statistic) -0.637 -1.745 -2.025 1.952 0.270 -0.189 -1.994 0.907 0.173 0.623 -0.329
PC 3 -0.0108 -0.0001 0.0143 -0.0209 0.1269 -0.1951 0.1786 -0.1504 -0.0249 -0.0014 -0.0387
(t-statistic) -0.215 -0.005 1.140 -0.590 1.323 -1.573 0.966 -0.150 -0.022 -0.006 -0.193
PC 4 0.0619 0.0336 -0.0263 -0.0079 -0.4359 -0.1193 0.1715 -0.3215 0.3008 0.6114 -0.6186
(t-statistic) 1.330 2.064 -2.255 -0.240 -4.896 -1.033 0.993 -0.349 0.283 3.193 -3.356
PC 5 -0.0489 -0.0139 0.0166 0.0181 0.0916 -0.2317 -0.2584 0.8703 -1.1762 -0.4057 -0.0531
(t-statistic) -1.758 -1.413 2.166 0.818 1.620 -3.079 -2.262 1.638 -1.915 -3.672 -0.499
PC 6 0.0111 0.0012 -0.0107 0.0466 -0.1659 0.0825 -0.2270 0.2680 -0.2612 0.1111 -0.1559
(t-statistic) 0.394 0.124 -1.572 2.421 -3.139 1.214 -2.258 0.475 -0.401 0.946 -1.380
                                           






Figure 12: Model implied 5-year Bund risk-neutral yield (expected future nominal short rate) (left panel) and the 
5y Bund term premium (right panel) estimated with the six-factor model (which uses PC1 to PC6) and 
unspanned macroeconomic variables: German unemployment, German core inflation, German leading indicator, 
and the Chinese leading indicator. I use an estimator as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample spans from 
June 2009 to December 2017. 
 
The 5y Bund risk-neutral yield presented in the left panel of Figure 12 decreased from 8 basis 
points in June 2009 to  49 basis points by December 2017. The 5y Bund term premium, 
depicted in the right panel of Figure 12, decreased from 2.5 percent in June 2009 to 1 percent 
in August 2010. It increased back to 2.5 percent by March 2011. After the sovereign debt 
crisis, the 5y Bund term premium decreased to 30 basis points by March 2013. By December 
2013, the 5y Bund term premium increased to 90 basis points. It decreased to  40 basis 
points by July 2016. The 5y Bund term premium increased to 30 basis points by December 
2017. 
 
To measure the effect of the Chinese leading indicator on the German yield curve, I perform 
a similar exercise as in the US case. I increase the principal components by the significant 
coefficients  ̂     which are estimated in Table 6 and multiply them by  0.01. I calculate the 
change of the in-sample mean of the 5y Treasury yield, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and 





















A one percentage point decrease of the Chinese leading indicator increases the model implied 
5y Bund yield by 3.8 basis points, the model implied 5y Bund term premium by 3.3 basis 
points, and the model implied 5y Bund risk-neutral by 0.5 basis points17. However, using the 
four-factor single country model, the model implied 5y Bund yield and its term premium 
decrease by 0.5 basis points in the post sovereign debt crisis sample (from December 2011 to 
December 2017). The 95 percent confidence interval in the post sovereign debt crisis sample 
includes zero effects. 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for a percentage points decrease of the 
Chinese leading indicator of the model implied 5y Bund yield is (1.7, 5.8), the model implied 
5y Bund term premium is (1.5, 5) and of the model implied 5y Bund risk-neutral yield is 
(0.2, 0.8). The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) in the post sovereign debt 
crisis sample using a four-factor single-country model of the model implied 5y Bund yield is 
( 2.4, 1.4), the model implied 5y Bund term premium is ( 2.43, 1.34) and of the model 
implied 5y Bund risk-neutral yield is (0.03, 0.06). 
 
Figure 13 presents the impulse response functions of the six principal components to “a unit” 
shock to the Chinese leading indicator in the model which includes the German 
macroeconomic variables. The variables which are included in the model are the six principal 
components (extracted jointly from the US and German yield curve), German 
unemployment, German core inflation, the German leading indicator, and the Chinese 
leading indicator. 
 
The response of the first principal component equals  0.0041 in the 1st month. The response 
of the first principal component increases in absolute terms to  0.0072 in the 5th month from 
where it reverts back to 0. Again, I divide the responses by 0.00168 which is equal to a 
response of the Chinese leading indicator on itself in period zero. Afterwards, I multiply the 
                                        
17
 When I do not condition on German unemployment, German core inflation and German leading indicator, 
average estimated effects in Germany decrease to (in absolute terms): the model implied 5y Bund yield decreases 
by  0.1 basis points, the model implied 5y Bund term premium by  0.15 basis points, and the model implied 5y 




response by  0.01 to quantify a one percentage point decrease. In Figure 13, we can observe 
that the responses of the fourth and the fifth principal components are significant as well. 
 
To measure the long-run effects of the Chinese leading indicator on the German yield curve, I 
increase the principal components by the significant responses in the 5
th
 month when the 




, and the 5
th
 PCs are significant and the largest in absolute terms. 
 
A one percentage point decrease of the Chinese leading indicator increases the in-sample 
average of the model implied 5y Bund yield by 5.9 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium 
by 4.7 basis points and the 5y Bund risk-neutral yield by 1.2 basis points in the 5
th
 month. 





However, using the four-factor single country model, in the 12th month, the model implied 5y 
Bund yield decreases by 22.5 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium by 21.9 basis points 
and the 5y Bund risk-neutral yield by 0.6 basis points in the post sovereign debt crisis sample 
(from December 2011 to December 2017). 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for a percentage points decrease of the 
Chinese leading indicator of the model implied 5y Bund yield in the 5th month is (1.2, 10.6), 
the model implied 5y Bund term premium is (0.7, 8.6) and of the model implied 5y Bund 
risk-neutral yield is (0.5, 2). 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for a percentage points decrease of the 
Chinese leading indicator in the 12th month in the post sovereign debt crisis sample using a 
single-country model of the model implied 5y Bund yield is ( 17.3,  27.7), the model 
implied 5y Bund term premium is ( 16.9,  27) and of the model implied 5y Bund risk-
neutral yield is ( 0.4,  0.7). The impulse response functions of the first four principal 
components extracted from the German yield curve to a positive impulse to the Chinese 
























Figure 13: Orthogonalized responses of the six principal components to the negative impulse to the Chinese leading indicator (Cholesky identification scheme with lower 
triangular variance-covariance matrix). Sample spans from June 2009 to December 2017. Variables included in the VAR are ordered as in the second row of Table 6. 
Response of PC 1 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 2 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 3 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 4 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 5 to “a unit” negative shock to 
Chinese leading indicator (orthagonalized IRF) 
Response of PC 6 to “a unit” negative shock to 





































































I estimate the joint affine term structure model of the US and German yield curves with the 
unspanned macroeconomic variables which include the Chinese leading indicator. I 
decompose the 5y nominal interest rates in the US and Germany in the 5y risk-neutral yields 
and the 5y term premia. I investigate how important is a Chinese slowdown we are observing 
after the financial crisis for the 5y nominal interest rates in the US and Germany, the 5y risk-
neutral yields, and the 5y term premia. 
 
I measure a Chinese slowdown as a growth differential between China and the US/Germany, 
which I empirically represent with the changes in the leading indicators. For each economy, 
in the model, I include the six principal components extracted jointly from the US and 
German yield curves, the domestic unemployment rate, the domestic core inflation rate, the 
domestic leading indicator, and the Chinese leading indicator. 
 
A one percentage point lower Chinese leading indicator lowers the 5y Treasury yield and the 
5y Treasury term premium by 4.1 basis points over the short run. In the 5th month, the 5y 
Treasury yield decreases by 10.2 basis points, the 5y Treasury term premium by 9.2 basis 
points, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 1 basis point. The 5y Bund yield increases 
by 3.8 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium by 3.3 basis points, and the 5y Bund risk-
neutral yield by 0.5 basis points over the short run. In the 5th month, the responses 
strengthen to 5.9 basis points, 4.7 basis points, and 1.2 basis points. However, the higher 5y 
Bund term premium could be driven by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.  
 
I re-estimate the four-factor single country affine term structure model in the post sovereign 
debt crisis sample for the German economy. In the 12th month, the model implied 5y Bund 
yield decreases by 22.5 basis points, the 5y Bund term premium by 21.9 basis points and the 
5y Bund risk-neutral yield by 0.6 basis points. 
 
My empirical findings suggest that the lower Chinese leading indicator helped to decrease the 
5y Treasury yield and its term premium after the financial crisis, and the 5y Bund yield and 
its term premium after the sovereign debt crisis. Long-term bonds provide a hedge against 




effective lower bound. Bondholders are willing to accept lower compensation for bearing the 
duration risk, the 5y term premium. In such an environment, investors became particularly 
sensitive towards the signals about the future growth and inflation risks such as deteriorating 
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A.1. Estimated parameters of the joint affine model of the US and German nominal term 





(standard error) (standard error)
  
      
     
Factor
PC 1 -0.0333 0.0729
(standard error) 0.0005 0.0009
PC 2 0.0549 -0.0478
(standard error) 0.0010 0.0018
PC 3 0.1900 -0.0444
(standard error) 0.0033 0.0057
PC 4 0.1676 0.2083
(standard error) 0.0059 0.0101
PC 5 -0.2907 -0.1817
(standard error) 0.0100 0.0172
PC 6 -0.2495 0.5342
(standard error) 0.0163 0.0280
  
      







(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6)
PC 1 0.0016 PC 1 1.0239 0.0168 0.0270 -0.0697 0.0156 -0.2475
(standard error) 0.0003 (standard error) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0016 0.0028 0.0044
PC 2 0.0033 PC 2 0.0132 1.0274 -0.0804 -0.0588 0.0619 0.1536
(standard error) 0.0004 (standard error) 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.0023 0.0039 0.0061
PC 3 0.0032 PC 3 0.0003 0.0194 1.0031 -0.0856 0.1813 0.2084
(standard error) 0.0009 (standard error) 0.0004 0.0008 0.0028 0.0048 0.0080 0.0157
PC 4 0.0034 PC 4 0.0127 0.0227 -0.0083 0.9695 0.2218 -0.2932
(standard error) 0.0009 (standard error) 0.0005 0.0009 0.0030 0.0052 0.0087 0.0169
PC 5 -0.0049 PC 5 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0108 0.0015 0.9408 0.0397
(standard error) 0.0015 (standard error) 0.0007 0.0014 0.0047 0.0080 0.0135 0.0241
PC 6 -0.0012 PC 6 0.0030 0.0041 -0.0397 0.0580 0.0114 0.6562
(standard error) 0.0003 (standard error) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0015 0.0025 0.0052
  
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Factor Factor
(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6)
PC 1 0.0016 PC 1 1.0239 0.0168 0.0270 -0.0697 0.0156 -0.2475
(standard error) 0.0003 (standard error) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0016 0.0028 0.0044
PC 2 0.0033 PC 2 0.0132 1.0274 -0.0804 -0.0588 0.0619 0.1536
(standard error) 0.0004 (standard error) 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.0023 0.0039 0.0061
PC 3 0.0032 PC 3 0.0003 0.0194 1.0031 -0.0856 0.1813 0.2084
(standard error) 0.0009 (standard error) 0.0004 0.0008 0.0028 0.0048 0.008 0.0157
PC 4 0.0034 PC 4 0.0127 0.0227 -0.0083 0.9695 0.2218 -0.2932
(standard error) 0.0009 (standard error) 0.0005 0.0009 0.003 0.0052 0.0087 0.0169
PC 5 -0.0049 PC 5 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0108 0.0015 0.9408 0.0397
(standard error) 0.0015 (standard error) 0.0007 0.0014 0.0047 0.008 0.0135 0.0241
PC 6 -0.0012 PC 6 0.0030 0.0041 -0.0397 0.058 0.0114 0.6562
(standard error) 0.0003 (standard error) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0015 0.0025 0.0052
  
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
   0.7491 + 0.0000i
   0.9417 + 0.0409i
   0.9417 - 0.0409i
   1.0009 + 0.0249i
   1.0009 - 0.0249i
   0.9865 + 0.0000i














(PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6) (          ) (             ) (             ) (               )
PC 1 0.0781
(standard error) 0.0058
PC 2 0.0272 0.0749
(standard error) 0.0087 0.0044
PC 3 0.0023 -0.0124 0.0181
(standard error) 0.0020 0.0019 0.0015
PC 4 0.0069 -0.0031 0.0054 0.0192
(standard error) 0.0021 0.0020 0.0024 0.0013
PC 5 0.0023 -0.0007 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0126
(standard error) 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0013 0.0009
PC 6 -0.0001 0.0031 0.0000 0.0057 0.0001 0.0114
(standard error) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0008
0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0013
(standard error) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
-0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0008
(standard error) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0015
(standard error) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
0.0009 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0021
(standard error) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001
   
    
    
    
      
     
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
    
   





















(PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (PC5) (PC6) (          ) (             ) (             ) (               )
PC 1 0.0823
(standard error) 0.0061
PC 2 0.0292 0.0786
(standard error) 0.0092 0.0046
PC 3 0.0026 -0.0143 0.0184
(standard error) 0.0020 0.0019 0.0016
PC 4 0.0057 -0.0031 0.0052 0.0199
(standard error) 0.0022 0.0021 0.0025 0.0013
PC 5 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0122
(standard error) 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0013 0.0009
PC 6 -0.0008 0.0027 0.0005 0.0060 -0.0009 0.0114
(standard error) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0008
0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006
(standard error) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0018
(standard error) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001
0.0004 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0022
(standard error) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 0.0002
0.0011 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0009 0.0007 0.0020 0.0019
(standard error) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
   
    
       
    
      
     
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
    
   




A.2. Orthogonalized responses of the four principal components extracted from the German yield curve to the positive impulse to the Chinese 
leading indicator (Cholesky identification scheme with lower triangular variance-covariance matrix). Sample spans from December 2011 to 
December 2017. Variables included in the VAR (1) model: the four principal components extracted from the German yield curve, German 
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Chapter 2: Chinese foreign reserves and the US yield curve 
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Abstract 
I estimate an affine term structure model with unspanned macroeconomic variables which include the 
Chinese foreign reserves. The low growth of the Chinese foreign reserves after the financial crisis is 
more important for movements of the 5y Treasury yield and its term premium than the high growth 
before. It signals lower 5y Treasury yield and decreases the compensation for bearing the duration risk 
(the 5y Treasury term premium). The economically important feedbacks from the level factor of the 
US yield curve suggest that the effects are running in both directions. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates to what extent the increasing prevalence of the Chinese economy in 
the global economy, and the accumulation of the foreign reserves, in particular, affected the 
US yield curve. In 1999, the share of the Chinese economy in the global economy equaled 3.4 
percent. The share of the Chinese economy increased to 15.1 percent in 2017. China has 
become one of the major powers in the global economy. 
 
From 1998 to 2007, China has experienced record high growth rates, 10 percent on average. 
However, China was managing the exchange rate. The Renminbi was pegged to the US 
Dollar since 1994. In 2005, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announced that China was 
moving towards a managed peg. The Renminbi preserved a tight link to the US Dollar. 
Specifically, the daily central parity rate was announced around which the Renminbi-US 
Dollar par fluctuated. The PBOC used this mechanism to hold back the appreciation of the 
Renminbi2. The foreign exchange policy has supported the export-oriented growth model of 
the Chinese economy. From July 2005 until December 2007 the Renminbi appreciated by 2 
percent relative to its trading partners3. To depreciate the Renminbi, among other measures, 
the PBOC buys US Dollars and sells the Renminbi. The PBOC’s efforts to hold back the 
                                        
1 
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2
 Das (2019) discusses the evolution of the Chinese foreign exchange rate policy over time into the greater detail.  
3




appreciation of the Renminbi combined with the Chinese current account surplus increased 
the Chinese foreign exchange reserves
4
. From December 2000 to December 2007, the PBOC 
accumulated 1.4 trillion US dollars of foreign reserves. Figure 1 (Panel A) illustrates the 
different channels which were at play before the financial crisis. 
 
After the financial crisis, China has slowed down. The average yearly growth of the real 
output decreased to 8.1 percent. The Renminbi continued to appreciate against its trading 
partners. The Chinese foreign exchange reserves increased to 4 trillion US dollars by June 
2014. From December 20007 to July 2015 the Renminbi appreciated by 36 percent. The 
strong Renminbi represented an additional anchor in times when the economic growth was 
slowing down. Given a substantial appreciation of the Renminbi in 2014 due to a strong US 
Dollar, and economic slowdown in China, market consensus was building that the Renminbi 
became overvalued5.  
 
In July 2015, the PBOC announced a change in the foreign exchange regime and a move 
closer towards the market determination of the Renminbi exchange rate. Market participants 
interpreted the regime change as the beginning of a sizeable Renminbi depreciation, a trend 
reversal. The PBOC intervened in foreign exchange markets to stabilize the Renminbi. In 
early 2016, the PBOC published a basket of currencies it plans to follow and put the new 
central parity mechanism in place (Das, 2019)
6. By December 2017, the Chinese foreign 
reserves decreased to 3.1 trillion US Dollars. The average yearly growth of the Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves decreased from 35.5 percent before the financial crisis to 10 percent 
after the financial crisis. Figure 1 (Panel B) illustrates the different channels which are at 
play after the financial crisis7. 
 
                                        
4
 The average Chinese current account surplus in period from 1999 to 2007 equaled 4.7 percent of GDP. 
5
 After substantial real appreciation in 2014 IMF's staff declared that Chinese currency is no longer undervalued. 
The announcement is available at https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15237  
6
 Basket is available at http://test.chinamoney.com.cn/english/svcnrl/20161229/2047.html 
7




Figure 1: Share of the Chinese economy in the global economy (in nominal GDP), and the connection between the Chinese foreign exchange 
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My main contribution is to quantify the effects of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves on 
the 5y Treasury yield, the 5y Treasury term premium, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral 
yield. The 5y Treasury yield can be decomposed in (1) the future expectations of the short 
rate (the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield), and (2) the compensation for bearing the term 
(duration) risk (the 5y Treasury term premium). 
 
I hypothesize that the Chinese foreign exchange reserves can change the 5y Treasury yield 
and its term premium in two opposite ways. 
 
First, the higher growth of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves typically also increases the 
dollar amount of the US Treasuries held by the PBOC. The higher debt holdings increase the 
prices of the US Treasuries which lowers the US nominal interest rates. These are direct 
effects of the Chinese foreign reserves on the US yield curve. Such an example is presented in 
the right part of Panel A in Figure 1. The major part of the PBOC’s holdings of the US 
Treasuries has a maturity of 5 years or less
8
. Therefore, the increased Chinese foreign reserves 
lower the 5y Treasury yield by lowering the compensation for bearing the duration risk (the 
5y Treasury term premium).  
 
Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez and Thomas (2013), for instance, estimate the effect of an 
increase in foreign official holdings of US Treasuries (from all foreign countries, not just from 
China) on the 5y Treasury term premium, and find the effect to be significantly negative9. 
Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate that in the period from 1984 to 2005 the 10y 
Treasury yield would be 80 basis points higher if there would be no foreign inflows into the 
US Treasuries. However, as such direct link of the foreign reserves on the US yield curve 
should manifest itself instantaneously the methodology developed in this paper by 
construction takes such direct effects out. Namely, in my empirical model, I assume that the 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves affect the US yield curve with a one month lag. 
 
                                        
8
 In June 2017 approximately 75 percent of the total Treasury and Agency debt held by the foreign Central Banks 
had the maturity of 5 years or less (Department of the Treasury, 2018, Exhibit 15). 
9
 The effect continues being negative even after taking into account the reaction by foreign private investors to 




Second, indirectly, the lower and even negative growth of the Chinese foreign reserves can be 
a result of (unexpected) significant depreciation of the Renminbi against the US Dollar and 
increased (unobserved) uncertainty about the future growth of the Chinese economy. The 
lower growth of Chinese foreign reserves can be a signal for risks related to lower future 
global growth and inflation. Such (unobserved) risks might be driving the predictive power of 
the Chinese foreign reserves on the US yield curve. China has become the second biggest 
economy in the world, and an important factor in global growth and inflation (Gauvin and 
Rebillard, 2015). In an environment where the monetary policy is constrained by the effective 
lower bound, these risks increase the nominal bond prices by signaling that the FED will 
have to keep rates lower for longer10. Such an example is presented in the upper right part of 
Panel B in Figure 1. Bondholders are willing to accept lower compensation for bearing the 
duration risk, the 5y Treasury term premium. 
 
In my companion paper, Maletic (2018), I estimate that in the post financial crisis sample a 
lower Chinese leading indicator lowers the 5y Treasury yield and decreases the compensation 
for bearing the duration risk (the 5y Treasury term premium). In this paper, I test whether 
the Chinese foreign exchange reserves represent incremental information to the Chinese 
leading indicator for the 5y Treasury yield and its term premium. Chinese leading indicator is 
measuring the growth rate of the Chinese economy. It does not, however, take into account 
the tight link between the US Dollar and the Renminbi which is crucial for manifestation of 
risks, such as growth and inflation risks, in the US yield curve through the Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves. 
 
The managed exchange rate forced the PBOC to follow the US Dollar by intervening in the 
foreign exchange market. If China would not be managing its exchange rate, the Chinese 
foreign reserves, which are an instrument of the foreign exchange policy, would not exhibit 
such a high correlation with the US Dollar. In my sample, the correlation between the yearly 
growth of the Dollar index and the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves is equal to  0.66. 
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I estimate the affine term structure model with unspanned macroeconomic variables in the 
period from December 2000 to December 2017 following Diez de Los Rios (2018). I follow 
Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez and Thomas (2013) and focus on the US term structure of up 
to 5 years. In the model, I include the four principal components extracted from the US yield 
curve, the US unemployment rate, US CPI inflation, the Chinese foreign exchange reserves, 
Chinese CPI inflation, the Dollar index, and the Chinese leading indicator. 
 
I motivate the inclusion of the US unemployment rate in the model because of two reasons: 
(1) to condition on the omitted factors such as the global output gap, and (2) to impose the 
Taylor rule in the short rate equation. 
 
The efforts to limit the appreciation of the Renminbi before the financial crisis took its toll. 
By following the monetary policy of the country to which the Renminbi was pegged, namely 
the US, the PBOC risked overheating the economy11. Chinese inflation increased from 0 
percent in 2000 to 8.5 percent in 2008
12
. Chinese inflation was unusually high in 2007 and 
2008 followed by deflation in 2009. 
 
It is important to condition on the Chinese CPI inflation and the US Dollar because a link of 
the Renminbi to the US Dollar drives systematic deviations of the actual exchange rate from 
the exchange rate implied by the relative purchasing power parity13. Such deviations could be 
driving risks related to the future growth and inflation of the Chinese economy, and increase 
the predictive information of the Chinese foreign reserves for the US yield curve. Bini Smaghi 
(2010) argues that anchoring the exchange rate involves several medium-term distortions, 
cost, and risks. The pickup of inflation rates in Emerging Market Economies, and China, in 
                                        
11
 Among others, Bini Smaghi (2010) stresses out that by managing their exchange rates emerging market 
economies imported the monetary policy stances of the developed economies which became suboptimal for the 
monetary policy stance of the emerging market economy. Bernanke (2017) discusses the US monetary policy in 
international context. 
12
 Kroeber (2011) points out that by keeping the Renminbi undervalued for too long PBOC could risk increasing 
the inflation so high that it could begin harming the Chinese real economic activity. Kroeber (2011) and Frankel 
(2015) discuss political aspects of Chinese monetary and exchange rate policies. 
13





particular, is one of them. In particular, the higher Chinese inflation relative to the US drives 
the expected depreciation of the Renminbi against the US Dollar (assuming the real exchange 
rate remains the same). 
 
To test the incremental information of the Chinese foreign reserves, the Chinese leading 
indicator should be included in the model as well. The principal components control for the 
feedback-loop from the US yield curve to the macroeconomic variables. 
 
My main empirical results yield several new findings. 
 
A 10 percentage point negative shock to the Chinese foreign reserves decreases the model 
implied 5y Treasury yield by 5.1 basis points over the short run. The 5y Treasury term 
premium decreases by 4.9 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 0.2 basis 
points. In the 24th month, the model implied 5y Treasury yield decreases by 34.9 basis points, 
the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 28.8 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-
neutral yield by 6.1 basis points. In the 24th month, the model implied 5y Treasury yield 
decreases by 28.2 basis points, the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 21.9 basis 
points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 6.3 basis points, when in addition I control 
for the nominal Renminbi effective exchange rate, the exchange rate of the Renminbi against 
the US Dollar, and the VIX index
14. 
 
In 2017, China and Japan were the biggest foreign holders of the US Treasuries. China, 
however, is managing its exchange rate against the US Dollar. Changes in Chinese foreign 
reserves became important for understanding the lower 5y Treasury yield, and especially 
unusually low 5y Treasury term premium we are observing after the financial crisis. The 
lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves signals a lower 5y Treasury yield and decreases 
the compensation for bearing the duration risk (the 5y Treasury term premium). The 
(unobserved) risks related to the (unexpected) significant depreciation of the Renminbi 
against the US Dollar, and the lower future growth of the Chinese economy, are decreasing 
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the Chinese foreign reserves, the 5y Treasury yield, and its term premium. China has become 
the second biggest economy in the world, an important player in global commodity markets, 
and hence an important contributor to global growth and inflation. 
 
My empirical findings suggest that the lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves after the 
financial crisis is more important for the 5y Treasury yield and its term premium than a 
relatively high growth of the Chinese foreign reserves before the financial crisis. 
 
However, Chinese debt holdings are akin to feedback-loop when considering the US nominal 
interest rates. One percentage point increase of the 5y Treasury yield increases the growth of 
the Chinese foreign reserves by 80 basis points. In the 24
th
 month, the response of the 
Chinese foreign reserves is still significant and equals 4.75 percentage points
15
. The positive 
direction is driven by the level factor of the US yield curve. Assuming that the (uncovered) 
interest rate parity holds higher US nominal interest rates depreciate the US Dollar against 
the US trading partners in the future
16
. As depreciating US Dollar tends to be accompanied 
by the accumulation of the Chinese foreign reserves, higher US nominal interest rates push 
the Chinese foreign reserves up as well. This economic mechanism helps to explain a 
relatively important contribution of the level factor for movements in the 5y Treasury term 
premium. Over the short run, a unit increase of the level factor increases the 5y Treasury 
yield by 13.2 basis points, the 5y Treasury term premium by 11 basis points and the 5y 
Treasury risk-neutral yield by 2.3 basis points. 
 
The Chinese official sector decreased the accumulation of foreign reserves after the financial 
crisis. Move towards the increased flexibility of the Renminbi exchange rate to address the 
significant appreciation of the Renminbi in late 2014 and early 2015 forced the Chinese 
                                        
15
 While the effect seems to be high at the first glance, the Chinese foreign reserves increased by 18x in the period 
from December 2000 to December 2017. The 5y Treasury yield decreased by 3 percentage points in the same 
period. Assuming duration of the Chinese foreign reserves equal to 10 and increase in the US nominal short rate 
which corresponds 1 to 1 to the 5y Treasury yield, the Chinese foreign reserves should decrease by 1.3x due to 
the lower US nominal short rate. 
16
 Interest rate parity follows logic that assets with the same risk should yield the same rate of return in Renminbi 




official sector to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent significant depreciation 
of the Renminbi in late 2015. Such interventions have lowered the growth of the Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves after the financial crisis (Das, 2019). 
 
The lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves provides a signal for lower US long-term 
interest rates in the future. In the US after the financial crisis, we are observing low levels of 
growth and inflation with the monetary policy constrained at the effective lower bound. In 
such an environment, the nominal bonds provide a hedge against the risks of lower growth 
and inflation. Bondholders are willing to accept lower compensation for holding long-term 
nominal bonds instead of short-term securities. This has pushed down the 5y Treasury term 
premium. My empirical findings suggest that the lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves 
provides economically important signals about the lower term premium of the 5y Treasuries 
after conditioning on the US Dollar, the Renminbi effective exchange rate, the exchange rate 
of Renminbi against the US Dollar, US unemployment rate and inflation, the growth and 
inflation rate of the Chinese economy, and the VIX index. Feedbacks from the level factor of 
the US yield curve on the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves suggest that the effects are 
running in both directions. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an affine term structure 






2. Affine Term Structure M odel 
I follow Diez de Los Rios (2015 and 2018). His estimator has a limiting distribution which is 
asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimation. The estimation starts with 
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Where 
  
  – spanned pricing factors (principal components)        
  
  – unspanned macroeconomic variables        
 
Shocks,    [      ] , conditionally on lagged principal components and unspanned 
macroeconomic variables follow a Normal distribution,   |{  }        (   ).  ,  , and   are 
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I use the principal component analysis and extract the principal components from the US 
yield curve which affect the bond prices directly (  
 ). The macroeconomic variables (  
 ) 
affect the bond prices merely through the principal components with a lag. In the model, I 
include the US unemployment rate, US CPI inflation, Chinese foreign reserves, Chinese CPI 
inflation, the Chinese leading indicator, and the US Dollar index. 
 
The bond pricing factors (principal components) and the nominal short-term interest rate are 
related through the affine relation 
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Under the risk-neutral probability measure, the spanned and unspanned factors follow the 
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Because unspanned macro factors do not affect bond prices under the risk-neutral measure 
the pricing (risk-neutral) transition matrices,    and   , can be written as 
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Therefore,   
   ,   
           ,   
           , the upper right       block of risk-
neutral matrix   ,    
  (      
  ) is zero, and       
         . Shocks,   
  
[  
    
  ] , conditionally on lagged principal components and unspanned macroeconomic 
variables follow a Normal distribution,   
 |{  }   
     (   ).   is the same matrix as in (1). 
 
Given the assumptions (1) – (5) bond prices are exponentially affine in the spanned factors 
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Following Diez de Los Rios (2018) recursive linear restrictions   
  and   
   are given as 
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When the prices of the risk parameters   
  and   
   in (8) and (9) are set to zero, the 
recursions generate the risk adjusted bond pricing parameters 
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Risk-adjusted parameters imply that the model-fitted yields equal the time   expectation of 
the average future short rates over the next   periods,   ( (
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( )
)   (
 
 
) (  
      
      
 ). 
The risk neutral yield (   ), and the term premium (  ), the difference between the model-
implied fitted yield and the risk neutral yield, can be written as 
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To investigate how unspanned macroeconomic variables (  
 ), and the Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves, in particular, affect the spanned factors (  
 ) and (log) bond prices 
(      
( )
) I focus on  ̂  . I increase principal components extracted from the US yield curve by 
the estimated coefficients  ̂   which are statistically significantly different from zero and 
correspond to the Chinese foreign reserves. I compare the change in the mean of the model 
implied 5y Treasury yield, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and the 5y Treasury term 
premium before and after I increase the principal components by the estimated coefficients 
 ̂  . I interpret the difference in the means as the average effect of the Chinese foreign 
reserves on the model implied 5y Treasury yield, the model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral 
yield and the model implied 5y Treasury term premium. 
 
3. Data 
I estimate the model at a monthly frequency from December 2000 to December 2017. I focus 
on the maturities from 1 to 60 months (5 years). The rest of the data is as follows. US CPI 




Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The US CPI inflation is measured as a log 12-month difference in 
the seasonally adjusted CPI index. I retrieve Chinese CPI inflation from OECD. Yearly 
change in Chinese foreign reserves is calculated as a 12-month log difference in Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves which are presented in Figure 4. The Chinese leading indicator is 
retrieved from the OECD. The US Dollar index is retrieved from the FRED database. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the 5y Treasury yield in the period from December 2000 to December 2017. 
The 5y Treasury yield decreased from 5 percent in December 2000 to 2 percent in January 
2009. It increased to 2.6 percent in March 2010 most probably due to ongoing Sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro Area. In August 2012, it reached a minimum of 0.6 percent. Following the 
FED’s hiking cycle which started in December 2015, the 5y Treasury yield increased to 2.2 
percent in December 2017. 
 
 
Figure 2: 5y Treasury yield. Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. 
 
Figure 3 shows the loadings of the first four principal components extracted from the US 
term structure on yields of different maturities. Loadings of the first principal component are 
fairly similar across maturities. Hence, the first principal component is usually denoted as the 
level factor. The second principal component loads negatively on the yields of shorter 
maturities and positively as we move to the maturities further out on the yield curve. 












third principal component resemble the usual shape of curvature. Since the yields used to 
estimate the affine term structure model are smoothed, the loadings of the fourth principal 




Figure 3: Loadings of principal component 1 (PC1), principal component 2 (PC2), principal component 3 (PC3), 
and principal component 4 (PC4) on yields of different maturities (60 monthly maturities). Sample spans from 
December 2000 to December 2017. 
 
In 1998, global allocated foreign reserves equaled 1.5 trillion US Dollars from where they 
increased to 10 trillion US dollars in 2017. At the end of 2017, more than 60 percent of the 
total allocated reserves were denominated in US dollars. The relative importance of Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves in the global reserves increased substantially over time. Figure 4 
shows the Chinese foreign exchange reserves. In December 1999, the Chinese foreign reserves 
equaled 160 million US Dollars. They increased to 3.2 trillion US Dollars by December 2011 
and increased further to 4 trillion US Dollars by June 2014. China is the biggest holder of the 
foreign exchange reserves in the world. In May 2018, the People’s Bank of China held 3.1 
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Between 1995 and 2010 China acquired roughly $1.1 trillion of US Treasury notes and 
bonds
18
. The accumulation reflects the Chinese current account surplus and the foreign 
exchange rate policy. China pegged the Renminbi to the US dollar in 1994. In July 2005, the 
Chinese authorities implemented a managed floating rate. The daily central parity rate was 
announced around which the Renminbi would fluctuate. In 2015, the PBOC announced a 
move towards a market based determination of the Renminbi exchange rate. On the day of 
the announcement, 11
th
 of August 2015, the Renminbi depreciated by 1.9 percent, and 
continued to depreciate (by additional 1 percent on 12
th
 of August 2015)19. The change of the 
exchange rate regime was a signal to a market of a prolonged period of the Renminbi 
depreciation. To prevent the negative effects of the significant Renminbi depreciation the 
PBOC intervened in the foreign exchange markets and appreciated the Renminbi which has 




Figure 4: Total foreign exchange reserves of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in millions of US dollars. Source: 
Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
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 Data can be obtained at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec.aspx 
19














Figure 5 depicts the Renminbi against the US Dollar, the level of the Dollar index, and the 
Renminbi nominal effective exchange rate. The Dollar index is the foreign exchange value of 
the US dollar which is weighted against the major US trading partners20,21. We can observe 
that until 2005 the Renminbi equaled 8.3 US Dollars. In July 2005, the PBOC moved away 
from the fixed and moved to a managed floating exchange rate regime. Until July 2015, the 
nominal effective exchange rate of the Renminbi appreciated by 44 percent. In August 2015, 
the PBOC announced a move towards increased flexibility in setting up the exchange rate 
which was followed by a managed depreciation. From July 2015 until December 2017 the 
nominal effective exchange rate of the Renminbi depreciated by 8 percent22. 
 
 
Figure 5: Renminbi/US Dollar, the Dollar index (in levels), and the Chinese nominal effective exchange rate. 
Series are presented in levels. Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Sources: St. Louis FRED and 
IMF. 
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 The share of China in the index increased from 6.6 percent in 1997 to 16.2 percent in 2017. The correlation 
between the US Dollar index and the USD/EUR exchange rate in the period from December 1999 to December 
2017 equals  0.92. The European Union is the biggest trading partner and represents 18.6 percent of the index in 
2017. The index weights are available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Weights/ 
21
 Data can be retrieved at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TWEXBMTH 
22
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Figure 6 depicts the Chinese foreign reserves and the Dollar index in 12-month differences to 
provide an intuition of how important is the historical link of the Renminbi to the US Dollar 
for the development of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves. 
 
The yearly growth of Chinese foreign exchange reserves increased from 7 percent in December 
2000 to 53 percent by November 2003. With some minor interruptions, the yearly growth of 
the Chinese foreign reserves stayed high until the financial crisis. The average yearly growth 
of Chinese foreign exchange reserves from November 2003 to December 2007 equaled 40 
percent. However, during the financial crisis, the growth of foreign reserves decreased 
substantially. By June 2009, the yearly growth of foreign reserves decreased to 18 percent. 
The growth increased back to 30 percent by June 2011. It equaled 0 percent in July 2012. 
 
The correlation between the Chinese foreign reserves and the yearly growth rate of the US 
Dollar index is high in absolute terms,  0.66. The weaker US Dollar pulls down the 
Renminbi which was pegged to the US Dollar before 2005 and afterwards linked to the US 
Dollar through the daily central parity rate. When the US Dollar depreciates, among other 
measures, the PBOC buys the foreign assets and sells the Renminbi in order to depreciate the 
Renminbi. We see several such episodes of the depreciating US Dollar before the financial 
crisis. 
 
From December 2000 to November 2003 the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves increased 
from 7 percent to 53 percent. The yearly growth rate of the US Dollar decreased from 6.3 
percent to  8 percent. The US Dollar depreciated by 14.3 percent. From January 2006 to 
November 2007 the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves increased from 35.5 percent to 44.1 
percent. The yearly growth rate of the US Dollar index decreased from 0.6 percent to  8.6 
percent. The US Dollar depreciated by 9.2 percent. 
 
However, after the financial crisis, the US Dollar tended to appreciate. From June 2006 to 
June 2012 the growth of Chinese foreign exchange reserves decreased from 30 percent to 1 
percent. The yearly growth rate of the US Dollar index increased from  9.6 percent to 7 
percent. The US Dollar appreciated by 16.6 percent. From July 2014 to August 2015 the 




rate of the US Dollar index increased from 0 percent to 14.6 percent. The US Dollar has 
appreciated. In Figure 4 we can observe that the foreign reserves decreased from 4 trillion US 
Dollars in June 2014 to 3.1 trillion US Dollars by December 2017. In the same period, the US 
dollar appreciated by 16 percent. 
 
At the end of my sample, the US Dollar has depreciated. From May 2016 to December 2017 
the yearly growth rate of the US Dollar index decreased from 5.4 percent to  6.1 percent. 
The growth of Chinese foreign reserves increased from  14 percent to 4.3 percent. In Figure 
6, we can see that the historical buildup of Chinese foreign reserves is not immune to the 
development of the US Dollar. The Renminbi was in one way or another linked to the US 
dollar throughout most of my sample. Correspondingly, when the US Dollar depreciates, the 
Chinese foreign reserves seem to increase. Especially after the financial crisis, we are 
witnessing several longer periods of the US Dollar appreciation. Correspondingly, the Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves have depleted. 
 
 
Figure 6: Chinese foreign reserves and the Dollar index. Both series are presented in log 12-month differences. 
Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Source: St. Louis FRED and the Chinese State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
 
The main contribution of my paper is to estimate the effects of the Chinese foreign reserves 
on the 5y Treasury yield and the US yield curve. I decompose the 5y Treasury yield in the 
























foreign reserves and the 5y Treasury term premium. We can see that both series are in a 
downward trend. The growth of Chinese foreign reserves increased from 7 percent in 
December 2000 to 53 percent in November 2003. Afterwards, the growth of the Chinese 
foreign reserves decreased to 4 percent by December 2017. Over the same period, the 5y 
Treasury term premium decreased from 1.8 percent in 200323 to 0.3 percent in 2017. 
 
The two series have a strong correlation in my sample. The correlation equals 0.69. After the 
financial crisis, we witnessed at least two episodes when the 5y Treasury term premium 
decreased at almost the same time as the Chinese foreign reserves. In March 2011, the 5y 
Treasury term premium locally peaked at 1.2 percent. There months later, the growth of the 
Chinese foreign reserves peaked at 30.3 percent. Both series reached a local minimum in July 
2012. The 5y Treasury term premium decreased to  0.7 percent, and the growth of the 
Chinese foreign reserves decreased to  1 percent. In December 2013, the 5y Treasury term 
premium was equal to 0.7 percent. The growth of the Chinese foreign reserves equaled 15.4 
percent. Both series decreased by 2016. In January 2016, the 5y Treasury term premium 
decreased to  0.2 percent. The growth of Chinese foreign reserves decreased to  15.3 
percent. 
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Figure 7: Chinese foreign reserves and the 5y Treasury term premium. Sample spans from December 2000 to 
December 2017. Source: Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and own calculations. The 5y 
Treasury term premium is extracted with the four-factor affine term structure model with the unspanned 
macroeconomic variables as presented in the second section of this paper. 
 
To motivate why it is important to control for the Chinese CPI inflation when measuring the 
effects of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves on the US yield curve, Figure 8 depicts 
Chinese inflation and the Chinese foreign exchange reserves from December 2000 to 
December 2017. The correlation between the series is equal to 0.21. Before the financial crisis, 
the correlation between the series equaled 0.35. It increased to 0.98 during the financial crisis 
(from December 2007 to June 2009) and decreased back to 0.43 after the crisis. We can 
observe that the Chinese CPI inflation increased from 0 percent in 2000 to 8.5 percent in 
April 2008. During the financial crisis, Chinese inflation decreased substantially. In July 2009, 
Chinese inflation equaled  1.8 percent. It increased to 6.4 percent in June 2011. Chinese 
inflation decreased to 1.7 percent in October 2012. After 2012, Chinese inflation became 
much less volatile. In the period from October 2012 to December 2017, its standard deviation 
































Figure 8: Chinese inflation (CPI index), and the Chinese foreign reserves in log 12-month differences. Sample 
spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Source: OECD and Chinese State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). 
 
Although not first order important for the results of this paper, I present the cross-
correlations between the Chinese CPI inflation, US CPI inflation, and the rest of the world. 
In the second column of Table 1, we can see that the correlation between the US and CPI 
inflation of advanced economies is high and equals 0.91. The correlation between the US and 
Chinese inflation is much lower, 0.37. However, the monthly correlation between the US and 
Chinese CPI inflation increases to 0.52 (not presented in Table 1, the series are plotted in 
Figure 9). The correlation between the Chinese CPI inflation and the inflation of advanced 
economies is in between these two numbers and equals 0.46. The correlation between Chinese 
CPI inflation and the CPI inflation of emerging market economies is the lowest, 0.09. Overall, 
the relatively low correlations between the Chinese CPI inflation and the rest of the world 
suggest that factors such as the pegged exchange rate and the Chinese foreign exchange rate 

























Table 1: Correlations between the Chinese CPI inflation rate, the US CPI inflation rate, the CPI inflation rate of 
advanced economies, the CPI inflation rate of Emerging market economies and the global CPI inflation. The data 




Figure 9 depicts the Chinese CPI inflation and the US CPI inflation at a monthly frequency. 
The US inflation increased from 3.4 percent in December 2000 to 4 percent by December 
2007. In the same period, the Chinese CPI inflation increased from 0 percent to 6.5 percent. 
During the financial crisis, we observed a sharp movement in both series. The swing in 
Chinese inflation was higher than in the US. At the end of the financial crisis, in June 2009, 
Chinese inflation decreased to  1.7 percent. US inflation decreased to  1.2 percent. After the 
crisis, Chinese inflation increased substantially. It was equal to 6.4 percent in June 2011. US 
inflation increased to 3.4 percent. The standard deviation of US inflation in the period from 
January 2012 to December 2017 equaled 0.8 percent. The standard deviation of Chinese 






0.087 0.368 0.578 1.000
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Figure 9: Chinese inflation (CPI index), and the US CPI inflation (log 12-month differences of seasonally adjusted 
CPI index). Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Source: OECD and St. Louis FRED. 
 
4. M ain Results 
In this section, I present my main empirical results. Before I introduce the decomposition of 
the 5y Treasury yield in the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and the 5y Treasury term 
premium, I present the short and long-run effects of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves on 
the actual 5y Treasury yield and vice-versa. Table 2 presents the estimated short-run effects. 
In the first row, we can see that the US unemployment and change of Chinese foreign 
reserves affect the 5y Treasury yield significantly. Albeit, the Chinese foreign reserves merely 
at the 6.3 percent level. One percentage point higher US unemployment rate decreases the 5y 
Treasury yield by 4 basis points. 
 
The estimated coefficients in the fourth column of Table 2 represent an increase of the 
Chinese reserves by “a unit”. In my case, this implies that the Chinese foreign reserves would 
increase by 100 percent. Therefore, a 10 percent increase of the Chinese foreign reserves 
increases the 5y Treasury yield by 3.6 basis points24. In the fourth row, we see the feedback 
from the 5y Treasury yield to the Chinese foreign reserves. One percentage point increase of 
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 The in-sample mean of the Chinese foreign reserves equals 20.4 percent, and standard deviation of the Chinese 














the 5y Treasury yield increases the Chinese foreign reserves by 0.81 percent. One percentage 
point increase in the Dollar index decreases the Chinese foreign reserves by 0.12 percent. 
When I replace the 5y Treasury yield with the four principal components extracted from the 
US yield curve, I find that only the estimated coefficient of the first principal component is 
affecting significantly the Chinese foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Table 2: Estimated coefficients of a five-variable vector autoregression:  
             . Variables included in the regression: 5y Treasury yield, US unemployment, US CPI inflation, 
Chinese foreign reserves, Chinese CPI inflation, the Dollar index, and the Chinese leading indicator. Sample spans 
from December 2000 to December 2017. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Figure 10 depicts the long run responses of the 5y Treasury yield to a unit shock to Chinese 
foreign reserves (left panel). The response of the 5y Treasury yield to a 10 percentage point 
increase of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves equals 3.6 basis points in the 1st month. I 
impose the Cholesky decomposition with the lower triangular variance-covariance matrix of 
shocks and order the Chinese foreign reserves last. While other variables can 
contemporaneously affect the Chinese foreign reserves, the foreign reserves are allowed only 
to react to other variables included in the vector-autoregression with a lag. In the 14th 
month, the response of the 5y Treasury yield peaks and increases to 23.5 basis points. 
 
The right panel of Figure 10 shows the responses of the Chinese foreign reserves to a one 




(          ) (             ) (Foreign reserves) (          ) (Dollar index) (          )
5y Treasury Yield 0.9051 -0.0399 -0.0180 0.0036 -0.0169 -0.0018 0.0034
(t-statistic) 29.40 -2.51 -0.79 1.86 -1.40 -0.29 0.45
0.0468 1.0211 -0.0154 0.0035 0.0006 0.0037 -0.0174
(t-statistic) 2.54 107.04 -1.12 3.00 0.08 0.99 -3.80
0.0454 -0.0438 0.7988 -0.0065 0.0456 -0.0307 0.0241
(t-statistic) 0.90 -1.68 21.39 -2.04 2.32 -3.04 1.92
Foreign reserves 0.8055 0.0338 -0.3444 0.9330 -0.0793 -0.1195 0.0513
(t-statistic) 2.70 0.22 -1.56 49.46 -0.68 -1.99 0.69
-0.0124 -0.0516 -0.0860 -0.0099 0.9571 -0.0318 0.0524
(t-statistic) -0.18 -1.46 -1.69 -2.30 35.73 -2.31 3.08
Dollar index -0.0386 0.2011 0.4395 0.0204 -0.1140 0.9382 -0.1982
(t-statistic) -0.19 1.92 2.92 1.59 -1.43 23.02 -3.93
0.1278 0.0748 -0.1750 0.0121 -0.1072 0.0324 0.9735
(t-statistic) 2.67 3.02 -4.92 3.98 -5.71 3.37 81.65
    
   
    
     
     
                
    
        




reserves increase by 0.80 percentage point in the 1
st
 month. The effect increases to 4.76 
percentage points in the 23
th
 month. In the 24
th
 month, the response decreases to 4.75 
percentage points and is still significantly different from 0. I perform a similar analysis to 








Figure 10: Orthogonalized impulse response functions of the 5y Treasury yield to 10 percentage point shock to 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves (left panel) in a structural vector auto-regression with Cholesky identification 
scheme. The right panel shows the responses of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves to 1 percentage point shock 
to the 5y Treasury yield. Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Variables included in the model: 
5y Treasury yield, US unemployment, US CPI inflation, Chinese foreign exchange reserves, Chinese CPI inflation, 
Chinese leading indicator, and the Dollar index. In the left panel, Chinese foreign exchange reserves are ordered 
last, and in the right panel, the 5y Treasury yield is ordered last. The lower-triangular variance-covariance matrix 
of shocks is imposed. 
 
Decomposition of the 5y Treasury yield in the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and the 5y 
Treasury term premium 
I estimate the affine term structure model of the US yield curve with the unspanned macro 
variables which are presented in Section 2 in the period from December 2000 to December 
2017 following Diez de Los Rios (2018). Table 3 presents the estimated prices of risks of the 
four-factor model. The level risk is priced by itself, the second, third principal component, 
and the Chinese foreign exchange reserves. The slope risk is priced only by the second 
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priced by the first, the second principal component, and the Chinese foreign reserves. The 
risk of the fourth principal component is priced by itself, the second principal component, 
and the Chinese foreign reserves. Therefore, Chinese foreign reserves affect all four principal 
components significantly. Among four different specifications, one-, two-, three-, and four-
factors, the four-factor model has the lowest average pricing error of the 5y Treasury yield, 
0.8 basis points. 
 
In Figure 10 we can see that feedback from the 5y Treasury yield to the foreign reserves is 
positive. Higher 5y Treasury yield implies lower bond prices. Since US Treasuries are an 
important part of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves, higher 5y Treasury yield should 
lower and not increase the growth of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves. I find that only 
the first principal component extracted from the US yield curve affects the growth of the 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves significantly. 
 
If the (uncovered) interest rate parity holds higher US nominal interest rates depreciate the 
US Dollar in the future (assuming that the real exchange rate remains unchanged). This 
increases Chinese foreign reserves. The economic mechanism helps to explain a relatively 
important contribution of the level factor for movements in the 5y Treasury term premium. 
A unit increase of the level factor increases the 5y Treasury yield by 13.2 basis points, the 5y 







Table 3: Estimated prices of risk,   
  and   
   in the affine term structure model as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. 
Spanned factors:   
  [                    ]
 . Unspanned factors:   
  [                                               ] .        – US unemployment rate, 
        – US CPI inflation rate,         – Chinese foreign exchange reserves,         – Chinese CPI inflation rate,               – The Dollar index, and         – Chinese 






(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (          ) (             ) (             ) (             ) (Dollar index) (            )
PC 1 0.3161 -0.0544 -0.2873 -0.7532 -0.8161 -1.3202 -1.0467 0.2432 -1.7183 -0.3543 0.0036
(t-statistic) 4.41 -2.39 -4.11 -3.06 -0.87 -1.31 -1.60 2.30 -1.36 -1.08 0.01
PC 2 0.0707 -0.0023 -0.1248 0.0290 0.0907 -0.1659 -0.3770 0.1065 -0.8660 -0.0341 -0.2338
(t-statistic) 2.26 -0.23 -4.08 0.27 0.22 -0.38 -1.32 2.31 -1.57 -0.24 -1.25
PC 3 -0.0123 0.0081 0.0433 -0.0651 -0.1142 0.2523 -0.0908 -0.0400 0.1054 -0.0848 -0.0500
(t-statistic) -1.02 2.12 3.69 -1.57 -0.73 1.50 -0.83 -2.26 0.50 -1.55 -0.70
PC 4 0.0044 -0.0009 -0.0197 -0.0212 -0.2162 0.0954 0.0583 0.0165 -0.1116 0.0007 0.0057
(t-statistic) 0.99 -0.64 -4.51 -1.37 -3.69 1.55 1.46 2.55 -1.44 0.04 0.22
                              
    
             




Figure 11 depicts the estimated 5y Treasury term premium (upper panel) and the estimated 
5y Treasury Risk-Neutral yield (lower panel) which are estimated with the unspanned affine 
term structure model. In December 2000, the 5y Treasury term premium equaled 2.9 percent. 
It steadily decreased to 0 percent in August 2010. The 5y Treasury yield, over the same 
period, decreased from 4.9 percent to 1.4 percent. The 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield 
decreased from 2.1 percent in December 2000 to 1.4 percent (lower panel of Figure 11). 
 
The 5y Treasury term premium increased from  0.1 percent in October 2010 to 1.1 percent 
in March 2011. The 5y Treasury term premium decreased to  1 percent in August 2012. This 
period coincides with the initiation of the QE programmes by the ECB. In December 2013, 
the 5y Treasury term premium peaked at 0.6 percent but overall stayed extremely low in the 
period from December 2014 to December 2017. At the end of my sample, in December 2017, 
the 5y Treasury term premium equaled 0.4 percent. 
 
The dotted red line in the lower panel of Figure 11 depicts the 1m Treasury yield. We can 
see that the dynamics of the 1m Treasury yield and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield are 
similar. Before the financial crisis, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield stayed most of the time 
below the 1m Treasury yield. The 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield decreased from 2.1 percent 
in December 2000 to 1.3 percent in March 2003. It increased to 2.1 percent in July 2006. In 
July 2006, the 1m Treasury yield was equal to 5.1 percent. 
 
After the financial crisis, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield is consistently above the 1m 
Treasury yield. In June 2009, when the NBER officially announced the end of the recession, 
the 5y Risk-Neutral yield was equal to 1.2 percent. The 1m Treasury yield was equal to 0.1 
percent. Between June 2009 and September 2015, the 1m Treasury yield was moving in a 
narrow band around zero percent. The 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield, on the other hand, 
increased to 1.6 percent in October 2012 and decreased to 1.2 percent in December 2013. 
After 2013, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield steadily increased. At the end of my sample, in 
December 2017, the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield increased to 1.8 percent. The 1m Treasury 








Figure 11: Model implied 5y Treasury term premium and the 5y Treasury expected future nominal short rate (risk 
neutral yield) estimated with the four-factor model (which uses PC1 to PC4) and unspanned macroeconomic 
variables: US unemployment, US CPI inflation, Chinese foreign exchange reserves, Chinese CPI inflation, the 
Dollar index, and the Chinese leading indicator. I use an estimator as outlined in Diez de Los Rios (2018). Sample 
spans from December 2000 to December 2017. 
 
To measure the effects of the Chinese foreign reserves on the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield 
and the 5y Treasury term premium I increase the principal components by the significant 
estimated coefficients which correspond to the Chinese foreign reserves,  ̂   , in Table 3. The 
model implied 5y Treasury yield increases by 51 basis points, the implied 5y Treasury term 
premium by 49 basis points and the implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 2 basis points. 

























unit”. In my case, this implies that the Chinese foreign reserves would increase by 100 
percent. I divide the estimated effects by 10. 
 
A 10 percentage point increase of the Chinese foreign reserves increases the model implied 
5y Treasury yield by 5.1 basis points, the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 4.9 
basis points and the model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 0.2 basis points. When 
additionally, I condition on the effective nominal Renminbi exchange rate, the Renminbi 
against the US Dollar and the VIX, the model implied 5y Treasury yield increases by 6.2 
basis points, the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 5.2 basis points and the model 
implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 1 basis points. 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) for 10 percentage points increase of the 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves of the model implied 5y Treasury yield is (0.8, 9.1), the 
model implied 5y Treasury term premium is (0.81, 8.7) and of the model implied 5y 
Treasury risk-neutral yield is ( 0.01, 0.4). 
 
When additionally I condition on the Renminbi nominal effective exchange rate, the 
Renminbi against the US Dollar and the VIX index, the 95 percent confidence interval (in 
basis points) for 10 percentage points increase of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves of the 
model implied 5y Treasury yield is (1.8, 10.5), the model implied 5y Treasury term premium 
is (1.4, 9.6) and of the model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield is (0.4, 0.9). 
 
Economically, I can interpret the estimated effects on the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and 
the 5y Treasury term premium as the impacts on the policy and the risk compensation 
channels. My empirical findings suggest that the lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves 
after the financial crisis seems to be more important for the 5y Treasury yield and the 5y 
Treasury term premium than the increase of the Chinese foreign reserves before the financial 
crisis (the 5y Treasury term premium and the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves are 
depicted in Figure 7). The lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves signals the lower 5y 






Long-run effects on the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield and the 5y Treasury term premium 
To measure the long run effects of the Chinese foreign reserves on the 5y Treasury risk-
neutral yield and the 5y Treasury term premium, in the last part of this section, I calculate 
the responses of the principal component 1 (PC1), the principal component 2 (PC2), the 
principal component 3 (PC3), and the principal component 4 (PC4) to “a unit” shock to 
Chinese foreign reserves. I condition on the US unemployment, US CPI inflation, Chinese 
CPI inflation, the US Dollar, and the Chinese leading indicator which I use in my companion 
paper (Maletic, 2018) to empirically represent the growth of the Chinese economy. Figure 12 
presents the responses. 
 
The PC1 increases by 0.006 in the first month. The response increases to 0.064 in the 24
th
 
month. The principal components do not have units and it is, therefore, difficult to argue if 
these effects are economically important or not. To measure the economic importance of the 
estimated responses of the PC1, I increase the PC1 by the estimated response in the 24th 
month, 0.064, and calculate the change in the average model implied 5y Treasury yield, the 
5y Treasury term premium, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield. 
 
However, I identify a shock to the Chinese foreign reserves by imposing the Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix and order the Chinese foreign reserves last 
(with the lower triangular variance-covariance matrix). I should, therefore, divide the 
response by the element in the Cholesky matrix which corresponds to the Chinese foreign 
reserves, a standard deviation implied by the Cholesky decomposition which is by definition 
equal to the response of the Chinese foreign reserves on itself in period zero. When I calculate 
the impulse-response function of the Chinese foreign reserves on itself, the Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves increase by 0.025 in period zero.  
 
Since I impose the Cholesky decomposition and order the Chinese foreign reserves last, the 
remaining variables included in the vector-autoregression are not affected in period zero. This 
can be checked by noticing that the column elements corresponding to the Chinese foreign 
reserves in the Cholesky matrix are equal to zero for all remaining variables which are 




Chinese foreign exchange reserves on the US yield curve, I divide the estimated effects by 
0.025 and multiply them by 0.1 (to scale a shock to a 10 percentage point increase of the 
Chinese foreign reserves). 
 
In a model which includes the US unemployment rate, US CPI inflation, Chinese CPI 
inflation, US Dollar index, Chinese leading indicator, and Chinese foreign reserves, a 10 
percentage point increase of the Chinese foreign reserves increases the model implied 5y 
Treasury yield by 34.9 basis points, the model implied 5y Treasury term premium by 28.8 




When additionally I condition on the effective nominal Renminbi effective exchange rate, the 
Renminbi against the US Dollar and VIX, a 10 percentage point increase of the Chinese 
foreign reserves increases the model implied 5y Treasury yield by 28.2 basis points, the model 
implied 5y Treasury term premium by 21.9 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral 
yield by 6.3 basis points in the 24th month. 
 
The 95 percent confidence interval (in basis points) in the 24th month for 10 percentage 
points increase of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves of the model implied 5y Treasury 
yield is (10.2, 59.6), the model implied 5y Treasury term premium is (8.4, 49.2) and of the 
model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield is (1.8, 10.4). 
 
When additionally I condition on the Renminbi nominal effective exchange rate, the 
Renminbi against the US Dollar and the VIX index, in the 24th month, the 95 percent 
confidence interval (in basis points) for 10 percentage points increase of the Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves of the model implied 5y Treasury yield is (3, 53.4), the model implied 5y 
Treasury term premium is (2.3, 41.4) and of the model implied 5y Treasury risk-neutral 















   
 
 
Figure 12: Orthogonalized impulse response functions of the first PC (upper left panel), the second PC (upper 
right panel), the third PC (lower left panel), and the fourth PC (lower right panel) to “a unit” shock to the 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves. Sample spans from December 2000 to December 2017. Variables included in the 
model: PC1 to PC4, US unemployment, US CPI inflation, Chinese foreign exchange reserves, Chinese CPI 
inflation, US Dollar index and Chinese leading indicator. The Chinese foreign exchange reserves are ordered last. 
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I quantify the effects of the growth of the Chinese foreign reserves on the 5y Treasury yield, 
the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield, and the 5y Treasury term premium. I estimate the affine 
term structure model with unspanned macroeconomic variables following Diez de Los Rios 
(2018) in the period from December 2000 to December 2017 which includes the Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves. The baseline model includes the four principal components 
extracted from the US yield curve, the US unemployment rate, US CPI inflation, Chinese 
inflation, the Chinese foreign exchange reserves, the Dollar index, and the Chinese leading 
indicator. 
 
The lower Chinese foreign reserves represent additional information to the inflation and 
growth rate of the Chinese economy, and signal a lower 5y Treasury yield and lower the 5y 
Treasury term premium. China is managing its exchange rate against the US Dollar. My 
empirical findings suggest that the lower growth of the Chinese foreign reserves after the 
financial crisis is more important for understanding the low 5y Treasury yield and its term 
premium than the high growth of the Chinese foreign reserves before the financial crisis. 
 
I find that a 10 percentage point decrease of the Chinese foreign reserves decreases the in-
sample average of the model implied 5y Treasury yield by 5.1 basis points, the 5y Treasury 
term premium by 4.9 basis points and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 0.2 basis points 
over the short run. The effects strengthen over the long run. In the 24th month, the 5y 
Treasury yield decreases by 34.9 basis points, the 5y Treasury term premium by 28.8 basis 
points, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 6.1 basis points. In the 24th month, the 5y 
Treasury yield decreases by 28.2 basis points, the 5y Treasury term premium by 21.9 basis 
points, and the 5y Treasury risk-neutral yield by 6.3 basis points, when additionally I 
condition on the nominal Renminbi effective exchange rate, the exchange rate of the 
Renminbi against the US Dollar, and the VIX. 
 
When the growth of the foreign reserves of the economy which is as big as China, is an 
important player in global commodity markets, manages its exchange rate against the US 
Dollar, and holds a substantial amount of US Treasuries decreases, it signals a lower 5y 




term premium). The risks related to the (unexpected) significant depreciation of the 
Renminbi against the US Dollar and the lower future growth of the Chinese economy are 
increasing the risks of lower future global growth and inflation, manifest in the lower Chinese 
foreign reserves, and decrease the 5y Treasury yield and its term premium. 
 
The economically important feedbacks are running from the US yield curve to the Chinese 
foreign reserves. The higher level of US nominal interest rates increases the growth of the 
Chinese foreign reserves. Under the (uncovered) interest rate parity, higher US nominal 
interest rates depreciate the US Dollar in the future. The PBOC accumulates US Treasuries 
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A.1. Estimated parameters of the affine model with the unspanned macroeconomic variables 


























(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4)
PC 1 0.0003 PC 1 0.9941 0.1083 -0.2222 0.3683
(standard error) 0.0000 (standard error) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0010
PC 2 0.0006 PC 2 -0.0032 1.0039 0.2672 -0.3225
(standard error) 0.0001 (standard error) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0013
PC 3 -0.0001 PC 3 0.0003 -0.0265 0.8872 0.4538
(standard error) 0.0000 (standard error) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0015
PC 4 0.0003 PC 4 0.0006 0.0119 0.0196 0.8134
(standard error) 0.0001 (standard error) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0016
  
       
       
       
       
 
Factor Factor
(constant) (PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4)
PC 1 0.0003 PC 1 0.9941 0.1083 -0.2222 0.3683
(standard error) 0.0000 (standard error) 0.0000 0.00 1 0.00 3 0.0010
PC 2 0.0006 PC 2 -0.0032 1.0 39 0.2672 -0.3225
(standard error) 0.0001 (standard error) 0.0000 0.00 1 0.00 4 0.0013
PC 3 -0.0001 PC 3 0.0003 -0.0265 0.8872 0.453
(standard error) 0.0000 (standard error) 0.0000 0.00 1 0.00 4 0.0015
PC 4 0.0003 PC 4 0.0006 0.0119 0.0196 0.8134
(standard error) 0.0001 (standard error) 0.0000 0.00 1 0.00 5 0.0016
  
       
       
      

















(PC1) (PC2) (PC3) (PC4) (          ) (             ) (             ) (             ) (Dollar index) (             )
PC 1 0.1284
(standard error) 0.0067
PC 2 0.0379 0.0428
(standard error) 0.0034 0.0028
PC 3 -0.0094 -0.0009 0.0197
(standard error) 0.0015 0.0018 0.0011
PC 4 0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0075
(standard error) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004
-0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0014
(standard error) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
-0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0055
(standard error) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002
-0.0012 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0242
(standard error) 0.0018 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0025 0.0018 0.0012
0.0005 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0039
(standard error) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
Dollar index 0.0012 -0.0022 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0074 -0.0048 0.0136
(standard error) 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0018 0.0009 0.0010 0.0017 0.0005
0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0035
(standard error) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
   
    
    
     
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
    
      
     
     






































Chapter 3: R&D Investments, Past Returns, and the Cross-
Section of Stock Returns 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates how R&D investments and past returns interact in explaining future returns. I gather 
empirical evidence showing that firms with a higher level of R&D investments, which have experienced lower past 
returns, are rewarded with higher future returns. Interaction with past returns has the opposite effect on future 
returns when a firm changes its R&D investments. Firms which increase their R&D investments are rewarded 
with higher future returns only if they have earned higher past 1-year returns. I am, however, unable to provide 
empirical support that firms with higher R&D investments, which have experienced lower past returns, are 
explaining higher future returns of firms with higher R&D-to-market value ratios. 
 
1. Introduction 
Chan et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence showing that firms with high R&D-to-market 
value ratios are rewarded with higher future returns. The R&D-to-market value ratio (RDM) 
is defined as: 
 
       
                   
               
 (1) 
 
R&D-to-market value ratio, however, is not measuring only the predictive power of R&D 
investments for the future stock returns. In its denominator, the market value of a company 
includes share price which affects past return. Chan et al. (2001) find that firms with a high 
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2 
Literature which has investigated the relationship between R&D investments and the future stock returns is 
amongst others (but surely not limited to): Eberhart et al. (2004), Chambers et al. (2002), Aboody and Lev 




In this paper, I gather the empirical evidence showing that level and changes in R&D 
investments interact differently with past returns when quantifying the effect on future stock 
returns. Firms which have a high level of R&D investments (high R&D-to-assets ratio) are 
rewarded with higher future returns if they have experienced lower past returns. A firm 
which changes (increases) R&D investments, on the other hand, is rewarded with higher 
future returns only if it has experienced higher past 1-year returns. I establish my key results 
by estimating Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions and testing the predictive power of 
the interaction term of R&D-to-assets ratio and the yearly growth rate of R&D investments 
with past 1-year returns. 
 
In the regressions, amongst others, I condition on the firm’s gross profitability
3,4
. On the one 
hand, investments in the R&D are associated with higher future economic profits and 
dividends which are increasing future returns. On the other hand, R&D investments are 
expensed in the same period as they are incurred which is decreasing earnings (net income 
before extraordinary items), and hence future returns. The gross profits which are defined as 
the revenues minus the costs of goods sold do not include R&D expenditures and measure the 
accounting profitability of R&D intensive firms before R&D investments are taken into 
account. An appealing feature of gross profitability is that it can be decomposed in R&D-to-
assets ratio and the inverse of another measure which is measuring R&D intensity, R&D-to-
gross profits. 
 
Chan et al. (2001) try to explain higher future returns of firms with high R&D-to-market 
value ratios by arguing that managers are investing large R&D outlays despite the firm has 
performed poorly because they are relatively optimistic about the firm’s future prospects. 
Market participants do not share the management’s insight about the firm’s business 
                                        
3 
In addition to gross profitability, in the cross sectional regressions I condition on book-to-market, size and 1-
month past return.  
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My empirical findings suggest that when managers are reluctant to cut the level of R&D 
expenditures despite the poor past performance the firm is rewarded with higher subsequent 
returns. When managers decide to increase their R&D expenditures, on the other hand, the 
good track record in the past price performance is providing the signal for higher future 
returns. Only firms that have demonstrated their ability to make good investment decisions, 
and therefore exerted positive price performance over the last year, are rewarded with higher 
future returns when they increase their R&D expenditures. 
 
Interaction of R&D investments (in levels or changes) with past returns is, however, unable 
to explain higher future returns of firms with higher R&D-to-market value ratios. Firms with 
high R&D-to-market value ratios seem to be rewarded with higher future returns which are 
unrelated to an interaction of R&D investments with past returns. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
interaction of R&D investments with past returns. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 
presents my main asset pricing results. Section 5 concludes. 
  
                                        
5 
In the introduction of their paper Chan et al. (2001) write: “The strongest signs of an association between R&D 
intensity and future returns come from stocks with high R&D relative to market value of equity (that tend to 
have experienced poor returns in the past) ... The market apparently gives insufficient credit to past losers who 
are spending heavily on R&D. Such firms probably face strong pressures to cut R&D and improve earnings. Their 
reluctance to do so, however, may reflect their managers’ confidence that future prospects are not so bleak. 
Nonetheless, the market tends to overlook such signals (just as it tends to discount other indicators of managers’ 




2. Literature review of the interaction of R&D investments 
with past returns 
 
Research has shown that it is important to take into account past performance for 
quantifying the effect of R&D investments on future stock returns. Chan et al. (2001), for 
instance, find that firms with high R&D-to-market value ratio on average earn higher future 
returns. They find that firms in the fifth R&D-to-market value ratio (RDM) portfolio earn an 
average annual return which is 11.1 percentage points higher than firms in the first RDM 
portfolio over the first three years after the portfolio formation. 
 
The difference in average annual three-year return shrinks to 1.3 percentage points when 
firms are sorted based on the R&D-to-sales ratio which does not include the past performance 
in the denominator. Chan et al. (2001) conclude that RDM has a better predictive power for 
future returns than R&D-to-sales (RDS). 
 
The stronger predictive power of the RDM relative to the R&D-to-sales ratio could be driven 
by a past performance which is in the denominator of the RDM. To investigate how past 
performance interacts with R&D investments, Chan et al. (2001) perform double sorts on 
R&D-to-sales and past returns. The difference in the future returns is the highest in the 
portfolio of firms which rank the highest based on the R&D-to-sales ratio and have 
experienced low vs. high past returns.  
 
The double-sort captures the joint effect of the R&D investments and the past return on the 
future stock returns. It does not, however, answer the question if the predictive power for 
future returns is different when level or changes of R&D investments interact with the past 
performance, and if the interaction is subsuming the power of R&D-to-market value ratio to 
predict future returns. 
 
Firms which rank the highest in terms of R&D-to-sales and rank in low past 3-year return 
portfolio on average earn three-year return which is 4.3 percentage points higher than firms 




points in the first R&D-to-sales portfolio and is negative in the second R&D portfolio ( 0.6 
percentage points). 
 
To measure a difference in the future returns of R&D intensive firms which have experienced 
low vs. high past return, Chan et al. (2001) perform a similar analysis in terms of excess 
returns. They match the firm with the control portfolio based on size, book-to-market, and 
past 3-year return. In Table 3 of their paper, Chan et al. (2001) report that the firm’s 
average excess 3-year return which ranks in the fifth portfolio based on the R&D-to-sales 
equals 2.4 percentage points. In Table 5 of their paper, Chan et al. (2001) report that the 
average excess return increases to 4.4 percentage points when the firm is additionally ranked 
in the low past 3-year return portfolio. The unexplained difference in returns, therefore, 
equals 2 percentage points. 
 
The average excess 3-year return of a firm which ranks in the first portfolio based on the 
R&D-to-sales equals  0.8 percentage points. The average excess return increases to  0.7 
percentage points when the firm is additionally ranked in the low past 3-year return portfolio. 
The difference, therefore, shrinks to 0.1 percentage point. The difference changes direction to 
 1.5 percentage points in the second R&D-to-sales portfolio (similarly as when I compare the 
difference in average returns of firms in low minus high past return portfolio which rank in 
the second R&D-to-sales portfolio). 
 
Although Chan et al.’s (2001) empirical findings clearly suggest that there exists a 
relationship between the R&D investments and past performance, based on the empirical 
analysis presented in Chan et al. (2001), one cannot conclude that the average return of a 
firm with high level of R&D expenditures which has experienced poor past performance is 
statistically significantly different from the average return of the firm which changes R&D 
investments and has experienced lower past performance. Eberhart et al. (2004), for instance, 
provide empirical evidence showing that changes in R&D-to-assets ratio provide value 
relevant information when they are significant (when R&D-to-assets ratio changes by more 





In this paper, I focus on the interaction of the level of R&D expenditures which I measure 
with R&D-to-assets ratio, with past returns, and changes in R&D expenditures which I 
measure with yearly growth rates with past returns. Past returns could affect differently 
future returns of firms which have a high level of R&D investments and returns of those 
firms which have recently increased their R&D spending. 
 
Additionally, I test if the interaction of R&D investments (in levels and changes) with past 




I follow Fama and French (2006) in constructing the book-to-market ratio (BM), market 
capitalization (MC) and cleaning the sample.   , book equity, is total assets (AT) minus 
liabilities (LT) plus balance sheet items deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITC) 
if available, minus preferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL) if available, or redemption 
value (PSTKR) if available, or carrying value (PSTK). Book equity in the regression for July 
of year     is for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t. The size variable,    , is 
measured at the end of June of year    . When I construct      , I measure    at the end 
of December of the year  . 
 
I drop financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
small firms with total assets less than or equal to $25 million, or book equity less than or 
equal to $12.5 million in year   to mitigate in sample small firm effect. I exclude firms with 
negative book equity or price in period  . Additionally, to be included in the sample, a firm 
must have Compustat data for year   on book equity, revenues, costs of goods sold, R&D 
expenditures, shares outstanding, and total assets. A firm must have a market cap (price 
times shares outstanding) available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database for December of   and June of    . 
 
Finally, the firm must have a dependent variable, monthly return, available in CRSP 
monthly database. I follow Novy-Marx (2013) and measure the past performance at the short 




of      and        requires that firm in period   has prices for           and      available 
in CRSP monthly database. I follow Fama and French (1995) and compute price return as a 
change in CRSP stock price from period   to    , or RETX variable where available. I drop 
firms with zero R&D expenditures. I do not drop observations of firms with negative R&D 
(Compustat data item XRD) following Wharton Compustat editors’ FAQ 636. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Sample spans from December 1975 to June 2014. 
 
 
Table 1 reveals that the average firm in the sample has 2 billion US Dollar of market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio which equals 1.2. The average firm has gross 
                                        
6 “As explained by the data vendor (also confirmed by our internal investigation), the cases of negative XAD and 
XRD are very rare. However, these are NOT data errors. For example, if you take a look at the following 
company (Energy Focus - GVKEY=030614), you will see that it did report two consecutive years of negative 
R&D expenses. You will need to dig into the actual filing itself to see why this is the case. Most likely, the 




Market Capitaliazion 414,964 2,044,817 6,858,517 24,023 9,075,230
Book-to-market ratio 414,964 1.2 4.5 0.1 2.3
Gross Profitability 414,964 37.9% 23.0% 4.8% 76.2%
R&D-to-gross profits 414,964 0.5 49.1 0.01 0.6
R&D-to-assets (RDA) 414,964 0.074 0.086 0.004 0.235
R&D-to-market value (RDM) 414,964 0.092 0.308 0.005 0.270
Yearly growth of R&D 
investments (delta R&D) 338,234 21.6% 98.5% -30.8% 89.5%
414,964 9.0% 58.1% -58.2% 100.0%
414,964 1.1% 14.7% -20.9% 25.1%
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Percentiles
      




profitability, which is defined as gross profits divided by total assets, which equals 37.9 
percent. The standard deviation of gross profitability equals 23 percent. 
 
The R&D-to-assets ratio on average equals 0.074 with a standard deviation of 0.086. The 
average R&D-to-gross profits ratio equals 0.5 with a standard deviation which equals 49.1. 
The average R&D-to-market value ratio equals 0.092 with a standard deviation of 0.308. The 
yearly growth of R&D investments on average equals 21.6 percent with a standard deviation 
of 98.5 percent. Standard deviations of R&D-to-gross profits ratio and yearly growth rate of 
R&D investments are higher than standard deviations of R&D-to-assets and R&D-to-market 
value ratios. I winsorize the distribution of independent variables at 1 and 99 percentiles to 
mitigate the effect of extreme values (outliers). 
 
Past 1-year return (      ) on average equals 9 percent with a standard deviation of 58.1 
percent. Average 1-month return (    ) equals 1.1 percent with standard deviation which is 
equal to 14.7 percent. 
 
4. M ain Asset Pricing Results 
 
In the first part of this section, I test which measure of R&D intensity provides better 
explanatory power for the future returns, (1) R&D-to-market value ratio, (2) R&D-to-assets 
ratio, (3) R&D-to-gross profits ratio or (4) yearly growth of R&D investments (delta R&D). I 
present decomposition of gross profitability into R&D-to-assets ratio and R&D-to-gross 
profits ratio to motivate the gross profitability as a control variable. 
 
In the second part of this section, I use Fama Macbeth cross-sectional regressions to test how 
R&D investments in levels, measured with R&D-to-assets ratio, and R&D investments in 
changes, measured with yearly growth rates, interact with past performance. Additionally, I 
test if the interaction of R&D investments (in levels or changes) with past performance can 
explain higher future returns of firms with higher R&D-to-market value ratios. 
 





       
                                  
               
 
                




            – Annual revenues of company   in time period  . 
                       – Annual costs of goods sold by company   in time period  . 
                – Total assets which equal total equity + total liabilities of company   in time period  . 
 






       
      




       
                   
               
 (4) 
  
        
                   
                
 (5) 
                    – Annual R&D expenditures as reported in the income statement of company   in time period  . 
 
I define the yearly growth rate of R&D investments (delta R&D) as 
 
 
             
                                          
                      
 (6) 
 
Since R&D expenditures are available at yearly frequency, the yearly growth rate is equal 
across 12 months during the year but varies across firms. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly stock returns 
on R&D-to-market value ratio (RDM), R&D-to-assets (RDA), R&D-to-gross profits 
(RDGP), the yearly growth rate of R&D investments (delta R&D), past 1-year return 
                                        
7 
In addition to decomposition presented in this paper, the gross profitability can be decomposed as well into an 
asset turnover and gross margin (Du Pont’s model). Novy-Marx (2013) finds that the gross profitability subsumes 




(      ) and gross profitability (GPA). Regressions include controls for size (ln(MC)), book-
to-market (BM) and short-horizon past performance (    ). The sample spans from 
December 1975 through June 2014. 
 
 
Table 2: Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of subsequent 1-month stock returns (    ) on past 1-year return 
(      ), R&D-to-market value ratio (RDM), R&D-to-assets (RDA), changes in R&D investments (delta R&D), 
gross profitability (GPA) and R&D-to-gross profits (RDGP). Regressions include controls for the log of market 
capitalization (ln(ME)), the log of book-to-market (ln(B/M)) and prior month return (    ). Independent 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. The sample covers December 1975 through June 2014, the year 
when FAS No. 2 (1974) came into effect. t-statistics are presented in the second rows. Slope coefficients with t-
statistics above 1.96 (in absolute terms) are bolded. Regressions use Newey-West standard errors (lag 12). 
 
 
Average R2 5.7% 5.3% 5.3% 5.5% 5.9% 6.0% 6.4%
Number of time periods 451 451 439 451 451 439 439















(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(1)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(2)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(3)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(4)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(5)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(6)
(t-values  in 
second rows) 
(7)
R&D-to-assets (RDA) 0.0338 0.0172 0.0145
2.25 1.01 0.93
R&D-to-gross profits (RDGP) 0.0080
1.60
Delta R&D -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0020
-1.61 -2.18 -2.33
R&D-to-market value (RDM) 0.0023 0.0018 0.0020 0.0015
2.89 3.60 2.46 2.91
GPA 0.0092 0.0092 0.0073 0.0079 0.0082 0.0059 0.0065
3.07 3.06 2.48 2.51 2.66 1.86 2.05
0.0036 0.0038 0.0023 0.0038 0.0037 0.0017 0.0016
1.45 1.53 0.87 1.55 1.52 0.66 0.61
log(ME) -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0010
-2.15 -2.45 -2.21 -2.10 -2.14 -1.95 -1.94
log(BM) 0.0030 0.0023 0.0012 0.0011 0.0017 0.0001 0.0007
3.22 2.20 1.12 0.85 1.69 0.04 0.66
-0.0475 -0.0462 -0.0476 -0.0483 -0.0489 -0.0489 -0.0494
-7.97 -7.44 -7.38 -7.93 -8.14 -7.82 -8.05
Independent variable
      




Specification 1 in Table 2 shows that the R&D-to-assets ratio has a positive average effect on 
the future 1-month return which is statistically significant. In specifications 2 and 3 we can 
see that the average cross-sectional slopes of R&D-to-gross-profits and changes in R&D 
investments are not significantly different from zero. In specification 4, we can see that the 
average effect of R&D-to-market value is positive and statistically significant. These 
empirical findings suggest that the R&D-to-assets and R&D-to-market value ratios have 
positive predictive power for future stock returns. Changes in R&D investments and R&D-to-
gross profits, on the other hand, do not have predictive power for future returns. 
 
I have estimated the cross-sectional regression which includes the R&D-to-sales and found, 
similarly as with the R&D-to-gross profits, that it has an average effect on the 1-month 
future return which is insignificant8. Difference between R&D-to-gross profits ratio and R&D-
to-sales ratio is that in case of the R&D-to-gross profits costs of goods sold are subtracted 
from the revenues in the denominator. 
 
I follow Novy-Marx (2013), Chan et al. (2001), and Chambers et al. (2002) and do not 
condition on the firm’s beta. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimate the cross-sectional 
regressions which condition on the firm’s beta and show that the coefficient on the R&D-to-
market value ratio remains positive and statistically significant. 
 
Specification 5 in Table 2 compares the predictive power of R&D-to-assets ratio and R&D-to-
market value. R&D-to-market value is subsuming the predictive power of R&D-to-assets 
ratio. The average cross-sectional slope of R&D-to-assets ratio is halved and becomes 
insignificant. Therefore, R&D-to-assets ratio is not explaining the positive predictive power of 
R&D-to-market value for future stock returns. 
 
To further investigate the interaction of R&D investments with past performance, 
specification 6 tests the predictive power of changes in R&D investments if I condition on 
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 In the regression which is similar to regression in specification 2 in Table 2 but includes R&D-to-sales 
instead of R&D-to-gross profits, the estimated average coefficient on the R&D-to-sales equals 0.0062 




R&D-to-market value ratio. We can see that the negative predictability of changes in R&D 
investments strengthens and becomes statistically significant when I condition on the R&D-
to-market value ratio. Specification 7 shows that average slopes of changes in R&D 
investments and R&D-to-market value ratio do not change when I additionally condition on 
the R&D-to-assets ratio. 
 
Therefore, these empirical findings suggest that higher R&D-to-market value predicts higher 
future returns which are unrelated to R&D-to-assets ratio or changes in R&D investments. 
While firms with high R&D-to-market value ratio on average earn higher returns, 
conditioning on the R&D-to-market value decreases future returns of firms which change 
R&D investments. The firm is rewarded with higher future returns if it has high R&D-to-
market value ratio while my empirical findings suggest that the firm is on average penalized 
with lower future returns if it increases R&D investments. 
 
Before I continue by interacting changes in R&D investments and R&D-to-assets ratio with 
past returns, Figure 1 depicts the cross-sectional correlations between gross profitability 
(GPA), R&D-to-assets (RDA), changes in R&D investments (delta R&D), R&D-to-market 
value ratio (RDM), and book-to-market ratio (BM). Correlation between gross profitability 
and R&D-to-assets is on average positive (0.11) but has in the year 1996 switched from being 
positive to negative. Therefore, while before 1996 firms which had higher R&D-to-assets were 
associated with higher gross profitability, after 1996 such an association has vanished. 
 
While average slope on changes in R&D investments becomes significant if I condition on 
R&D-to-market value ratio (specification 6 in Table 2), Figure 1 shows that changes in R&D 
investments and R&D-to-market value ratio are essentially uncorrelated. Time series average 
of cross-sectional correlations between changes in R&D investments and R&D-to-market 
value ratio equals 0.001 (red curve in Figure 1). The average cross-sectional correlation 
between the book-to-market ratio and changes in R&D investments is slightly higher in 
absolute terms and on average equals  0.03 (green curve in Figure 1). It exhibits similar 
time-series pattern as the cross-sectional correlation between changes in R&D investments 





Figure 1: Cross-sectional correlations between gross profitability (GPA), R&D-to-assets (RDA), R&D-to-market 
value ratio (RDM), and changes in R&D investments (delta R&D). Time averages of cross-sectional correlations 
are presented in brackets. 
 
 
In order to test the full effect of past returns, R&D investments and their potential mutual 
reinforcement on the future returns, I extend the model with an interaction term between 
R&D investments and past returns. Table 3 presents the results of cross-sectional regressions. 
I follow Novy-Marx (2013) and measure (long-run) past performance with the past 1-year 
return. In the cross-sectional regressions, I have tested the predictive power of the past 3-year 
return and found that in the sample of firms which report R&D expenditures it has lower 
predictive power for the future returns than the past 1-year return9. I should stress out that 
in the cross-sectional regressions, I condition on the short-run past performance,     , which 
is highly statistically significant, and takes the major bulk of the return reversal out of the 
future 1-month return. 
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 In the regression which is similar to regression in specification 1 in Table 3 but includes the past 3-
year performance instead of the past 1-year performance, the estimated average coefficient on the past 

















Table 3: Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of subsequent 1-month stock returns (    ) on past 1-year return 
(      ), R&D-to-assets (RDA), R&D-to-market value ratio (RDM), changes in R&D investments (delta R&D), 
the interaction term between R&D-to-assets and past returns (R&D-to-assets        ), and the interaction term 
between changes in R&D investments and past returns (delta R&D        ). Regressions include controls for the 
gross profitability (GPA), log of market capitalization (ln(ME)), the log of book-to-market (ln(B/M)) and prior 
month return (    ). Independent variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. The sample covers December 
1975 through June 2014, the year when FAS No. 2 (1974) came into effect. t-statistics are presented in the second 
rows. Slope coefficients with t-statistics above 1.96 (in absolute terms) are bolded. Regressions use Newey-West 
standard errors (lag 12). 
 
 
Average R2 4.9% 6.2% 5.4% 6.2% 5.4%
Number of time periods 451 451 451 439 439











(p-values  in 
parenthesis) 
(1)
(p-values  in 
parenthesis) 
(2)
(p-values  in 
parenthesis) 
(3)
(p-values  in 
parenthesis) 
(4)
(p-values  in 
parenthesis) 
(5)
0.0040 0.0057 0.0058 0.0002 0.0005
1.61 2.01 2.17 0.07 0.21




Delta R&D -0.0024 -0.0024
-2.61 -2.69
Delta R&D 0.0094 0.0086
4.42 4.22
R&D-to-market value (RDM) 0.0018 0.0019 0.0021 0.0021
3.59 3.76 2.49 2.50
GPA 0.0089 0.0082 0.0078 0.0060 0.0055
2.96 2.66 2.61 1.88 1.75
log(ME) -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0012
-2.42 -2.14 -2.39 -1.97 -2.19
log(BM) 0.0022 0.0016 0.0016 0.0000 0.0001




      
        
    




Specification 1 in Table 3 shows that past 1-year performance does not have a statistically 
significant average effect on the future 1-month return once I condition on the past 1-month 
return. The average estimated slope of the short-run performance (      is negative and 
statistically significant. Therefore, a bulk of return reversal comes from the previous month’s 
return. 
 
In specification 2 in Table 3, I test the predictive power of the interaction term between the 
RDA and the past 1-year performance on the future 1-month return. I define the interaction 
term as the R&D-to-assets ratio which I multiply by the past 1-year return: 
 
 
                                          (7) 
 
We can see that the average slope of the interaction term between R&D-to-assets ratio and 
past 1-year performance is negative (specification 2). Therefore, these empirical findings 
support the argument that firms which have high R&D-to-assets ratio and have experienced 
poor past performance on average earn higher future returns. In specification 3, we can also 
see that the average slope changes marginally if I do not condition on the past 1-month 
return (which is in the last row of Table 3). 
 
Last two specifications in Table 3 (specification 4 and 5) test the predictive power when 
changes in R&D investments are interacted with past 1-year returns: 
 
 
                                              (8) 
 
In specification 4, we can see that changes in R&D investments preserve their negative 
predictive power for future returns. The firm which increases R&D investments and does not 
experience higher past returns earns lower future returns (average slope equals  0.0024). 
Interestingly, the interaction term between changes in R&D investments and past 1-year 




0.0094). Specification 4 shows that firms which increase R&D investments are rewarded with 
higher future returns only if they have experienced higher past 1-year returns. 
 
Specification 5 in Table 3 shows that the average cross-sectional slope of changes in R&D 
investments remains unchanged if I do not condition on the past 1-month performance. 
Similarly, the average cross-sectional slope of the interaction term between changes in R&D 
investments and past 1-year performance is marginally changed when I do not condition on 
the past 1-month performance. It decreases from 0.0094 to 0.0086. 
 
I have checked the robustness of results presented in specifications 2 and 4 in Table 3 using 
the weighted least squares estimator. I weight the contribution of each firm in the cross-
section by its size, log of its market value. In specification 2, the estimated average cross-
sectional slope of the interaction term marginally decreases, to  0.0513. In specification 4, 
the estimated average cross-sectional slope of the interaction term marginally increases, to 
0.0096. Hence, the estimated average effects of the interaction terms do not change 
significantly when the observations are weighted by the firm’s size. 
 
My empirical findings suggest that the interaction of R&D investments with past 
performance is important for future stock returns. Firms with high R&D investments relative 
to their assets (high R&D-to-assets ratio) which have experienced poor past performance 
(negative 1-year past returns) earn higher future stock returns. On the other hand, firms 
which increase their R&D investments are rewarded with higher future returns only if they 
have experienced higher past 1-year returns. The information in past 1-year performance, 
therefore, seems to provide value relevant signal for future returns of firms with a high level 
of R&D investments and firms which are changing (increasing) their R&D investments. 
 
Specifications 2 to 5 also show that the interaction of R&D investments (in levels or changes) 
with past performance is not explaining higher returns of firms with high R&D-to-market 
value ratios. R&D anomaly, namely that firms with high R&D-to-market value ratios earn 






In this paper, I investigate how the interactions of R&D investments (in levels and changes) 
with past returns affect future stock returns. I find that firms with a high level of R&D 
investments (high R&D-to-assets ratios) earn higher future returns if they have experienced 
lower past returns. Firms which increase R&D investments, on the other hand, are rewarded 
with higher future returns only if they have experienced higher past returns. 
 
When managers are reluctant to cut the level of R&D expenditures despite the poor past 
performance the firm is rewarded with higher subsequent returns. On the other hand, when 
managers increase the R&D outlays the good track record in the past price performance is 
providing the signal for future returns. Only firms which have demonstrated their ability to 
make good investment decisions, and therefore earned positive returns over the last year are 
rewarded with higher future returns. 
 
Interaction of R&D investments (in levels or changes) with past returns is, however, unable 
to explain higher future returns of firms with high R&D-to-market value ratios. Higher 
returns of firms with high R&D-to-market value ratios are unrelated to the interaction of 
R&D investments with past returns. I am unable to provide empirical support for the 
argument that higher future returns of firms with high R&D-to-market value ratios are 
related to firms with a high level of R&D investments which have experienced lower past 
returns. 
 
Past performance is providing value-relevant signals for future returns of firms with either 
higher level of R&D investments or higher growth rates of R&D spending. Higher returns of 
firms with high R&D-to-market value ratios, however, remain unexplained after taking into 
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